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UNDERPROSECUTION TOO
Michal Buchhandler-Raphael *
“First, they refused to believe me. Then they shamed me. Then
they silenced me.” 1
INTRODUCTION
In 2016, Donna Doe, a nineteen-year-old student at Baylor University in Waco, Texas, attended a party at the school’s fraternity
chapter of Phi Delta Theta.2 She claimed that after she had drunk
some punch and felt woozy, Jacob Anderson, who was at that time
the fraternity’s president, raped her multiple times.3 Doe further
alleged that after she blacked out, Anderson dumped her face down
on the ground and left.4
Anderson was arrested, expelled from school, and in June 2018,
a grand jury indicted him on four sexual assault charges stemming
from these allegations.5 Yet, the District Attorney’s office refused

* Assistant Professor of Law, Widener Commonwealth Law School. I am grateful to
Francine Banner, Avlana Eisenberg, Zachary Kauffman, Alexandra Klein and Deborah
Tuerkheimer for invaluable feedback on this draft. For helpful comments, suggestions and
conversations on earlier drafts, I am grateful to Anne Coughlin, Michelle Madden Dempsey,
Mihailis Diamantis, Cynthia Godsoe, Laura Kessler, Daniel McConkie, Anna Roberts, and
Nicole Shackleton. I also thank Stephanie Patton for her excellent research assistance. Finally, thank you to the editors of the University of Richmond Law Review, especially Maya
Ravindran, for their thorough edits.
1. LACY CRAWFORD, NOTES ON A SILENCING, A MEMOIR (2020).
2. See Eli Rosenberg & Kristine Phillips, Accused of Rape, Former Baylor Fraternity
President Gets No Jail Time After Plea Deal, WASH. POST (Dec. 11, 2018), https://www.wash
ingtonpost.com/education/2018/12/11/accused-rape-former-frat-president-gets-no-jail-timeafter-plea-deal-da/ [https://perma.cc/2NZP-Q9AP].
3. See Mitch Mitchell & Kaley Johnson, Ex-Frat President at Baylor Gets No Jail Time
in Rape Case as Judge Accepts Plea Deal, FORT WORTH STAR-TELEGRAM (Dec. 10, 2018),
https://www.star-telegram.com/news/state/texas/article222888435.html [https://perma.cc/2
3AY-KRDN].
4. See id.; see also An Ex-Baylor Student Says She Was Raped, but the Suspect Got
Probation. Read Her Victim Impact Statement, CNN (Dec. 11, 2018, 3:11 PM), https://www.
cnn.com/2018/12/11/us/baylor-rape-allegation-victim-impact-statement/index.html [https://
perma.cc/AAY6-DQM2].
5. See Rosenberg & Phillips, supra note 2.
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to try Anderson in court for the sexual assaults.6 Instead, the prosecutor accepted a guilty plea that convicted Anderson of unlawful
restraint, a crime of a nonsexual nature, which resulted only in a
probation sentence.7 The prosecutor’s reasons for refusing to bring
to trial the sexual assault charges were stated in her letter to the
complainant,8 which included, among others, the following statements:
I’ve accepted an offer [of a plea agreement] on Jacob Anderson. It’s for
probation on the charge of Felony Unlawful Restraint not Sexual Assault—therefore, he will not have to register as a sex offender. I realize this is not the outcome we had hoped for or that I had originally
offered, but I tried a very similar case to this one last month, and
lost. . . . In light of the similarities between the cases, it’s my opinion
it would be worse to try Anderson and lose and have the entire matter
wiped from his criminal history than to accept this plea offer. . . . It’s
my opinion that our jurors aren’t ready to blame rapists and not victims when there isn’t concrete proof of more than one victim. . . . Multiple victims put the focus properly on the criminal’s conduct. That
didn’t happen when there was only one victim and one event to talk
about. . . . I think this jury . . . was looking for any excuse not to find
an innocent looking young defendant guilty. They engaged in a lot of
victim blaming—and the behavior of that victim . . . is very similar.
. . . Not to mention the emotional damage this victim would have to
deal with if she had to testify and then felt the jury thought she was
a liar.9

The refusal to try this sexual assault due to concerns that a hypothetical jury was unlikely to convict the defendant is illustrative
of the prosecutorial treatment of many sexual assault cases, resulting in the underprosecution of these crimes.10 This prevalent phenomenon occurs when complainants report to police that they have
been sexually assaulted, a criminal investigation is conducted, and
there is probable cause that the crime had been committed and arguably sufficient evidence to prove it beyond a reasonable doubt.

6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Throughout the Article, I use the terms “victims” and “complainants,” rather than
“survivors,” although I recognize that many would prefer the latter term. I choose to use the
former terms because they are more neutral and are applicable in all crimes, whereas the
term “survivors” is unique to sexual assault cases.
9. See Holly Yan, A Prosecutor Refuses to Try an Ex-Frat Leader’s Sex Assault Case.
Here Are Her Eye-Opening Reasons Why, CNN (Dec. 13, 2018), https://www.cnn.com/2018
/12/12/us/baylor-rape-allegation-letter-from-prosecutor/index.html [https://perma.cc/T3PQLGLN].
10. See infra sections I.A–B.
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Yet, prosecutors refuse to try the alleged attacker for the sexual
assault.11
Ample studies show that prosecutors pursue criminal charges
only in a small fraction of sexual assault cases.12 These studies further demonstrate that prosecutors decline to bring sexual assault
charges in the vast majority of these cases, mostly citing to “insufficient evidence” to justify their decisions.13 This Article relies on,
among other things, findings of a recent study identifying the main
reasons for high attrition rates in sexual assault cases.14 The study
found that prosecutors routinely decide not to pursue charges for
reasons unrelated to the legal merits of the case.15 Instead, prosecutors frequently use the designation “insufficient evidence” as a
pretext, when in fact the actual reason underlying the declination
decision is their prediction that hypothetical jurors are unlikely to
convict because they would likely discredit the complainant’s account.16 Here, I refer to the practice of declining to prosecute sexual
assault cases for this reason as reliance on the convictability standard.17 The upshot of such deference to potential juries’ unfavorable

11. These cases further vary, as in some, prosecutors decline altogether to pursue any
criminal charges, while in others, they refuse to try the defendant in court for the sexual
assault, accepting a plea bargain that does not include an offense of a sexual nature but
only a conviction of a relatively minor offense. For additional examples illustrating the refusal to prosecute sexual assault cases see, Petition for Appointment of a Prosecutor Pro
Tempore, In re Jane Doe 1, Jane Doe 2, Jane Doe 3, and Jane Doe 4 (Utah) (No. 2018-0839),
2018 WL 6015550 at *7–22; First Amended Class Action Complaint, Smith v. City of Austin
(W.D. Tex. Austin Div.) (No. 18-cv-505), 2018 WL 8809225.
12. See Deborah Tuerkheimer, Incredible Women: Sexual Violence and the Credibility
Discount, 160 UNIV. PA. L. REV. 1, 36, 38–41 (2017).
13. See CASSIA SPOHN & KATHARINE TELLIS, POLICING AND PROSECUTING SEXUAL
ASSAULT IN LOS ANGELES CITY AND COUNTY: A COLLABORATIVE STUDY IN PARTNERSHIP
WITH THE LOS ANGELES POLICE DEPARTMENT, THE LOS ANGELES SHERRIFF DEPARTMENT
AND THE LOS ANGELES COUNTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY’S OFFICE 297 (2012).
14. See MELISSA S. MORABITO, LINDA M. WILLIAMS & APRIL PATTAVINA, NAT’L CRIM.
JUST. REFERENCE SERV., DECISION MAKING IN SEXUAL ASSAULT CASES: REPLICATION
RESEARCH ON SEXUAL VIOLENCE CASE ATTRITION IN THE UNITED STATES (2019).
15. Id. at 4–5.
16. See Michelle Madden Dempsey, Prosecuting Violence Against Women: Toward a
“Merits-Based” Approach to Evidentiary Sufficiency, 14 UNIV. PALERMO L. REV. 241, 245
(2015). For an English translation, see Michelle Madden Dempsey, Prosecuting Violence
Against Women: Toward a “Merits-Based Approach to Evidentiary Sufficiency” (Villanova
Univ. Charles Widger Sch. L., Pub. L. & Legal Theory, Working Paper No. 2016-1032),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2858361 [https://perma.cc/VM5K-QV
LY].
17. For a general definition of prosecutorial declination and discussion of the phenomenon, see Jessica Roth, Prosecutorial Declination Statements, 110 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 477, 487–88 (2020).
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perception of complainants’ credibility is the underprosecution of
sexual assault.18
The claim that sexual assaults are underprosecuted might raise
initial skepticism among some readers, given the conventional wisdom that problems of excesses rather than shortages plague the
criminal legal system. Overcriminalization and overenforcement,
including both overpolicing and overprosecution, are indeed pervasive problems that characterize most crimes.19 Voluminous literature addresses these deficiencies, emphasizing their disparate effects on racial minorities, and calling for comprehensive reforms of
the racially unjust legal system.20
Distinct concerns about overenforcement also underlie the legal
system’s treatment of sexual assault charges brought against defendants of color, given the profound risks of disproportionate effect on them.21 Black men have historically often been wrongly
prosecuted for crimes allegedly committed against white women,
and have excessively endured both legal and extralegal modes of
punishment.22
Yet, the conventional account that exclusively highlights problems of overenforcement is only partially accurate because it reflects prevalent enforcement practices that characterize most, but
not all, types of crimes. The overenforcement paradigm largely obfuscates a parallel problem of underenforcement that is ubiquitous
in specific types of crime, including sex crimes.23
In recent years, commentators began to identify the phenomena
of underpolicing and underprosecution of some categories of
crime.24 A common feature underlying these crimes is that their
victims are often racial minorities or otherwise marginalized
18. See Tuerkheimer, supra note 12, at 36–41.
19. See infra section I.A.
20. Infra section I.A.
21. See I. Bennett Capers, The Unintentional Rapist, 87 WASH. UNIV. L. REV. 1345,
1355 (2010).
22. See AYA GRUBER, THE FEMINIST WAR ON CRIME: THE UNEXPECTED ROLE OF
WOMEN’S LIBERATION IN MASS INCARCERATION 32–40 (2020).
23. See Alexandra Natapoff, Underenforcement, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1715, 1722–33
(2006) (identifying for the first time the underenforcement problem and coining the term to
describe it).
24. See Deborah Tuerkheimer, Underenforcement as Unequal Protection, 57 B.C. L.
REV. 1287, 1292–1303 (2016). See generally Corey Rayburn Yung, Rape Law Gatekeeping,
58 B.C. L. REV. 205 (2017) [hereinafter Yung, Rape Law Gatekeeping]; Corey Rayburn Yung,
How to Lie with Rape Statistics: America’s Hidden Rape Crisis, 99 IOWA L. REV. 1197 (2014)
[hereinafter Yung, Rape Statistics].
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individuals. These people have been historically underserved by a
legal system that has failed to provide them with equal protection
of the law, thus rendering their victimization invisible.25
The failure to adequately prosecute sexual assault poignantly illustrates how the most vulnerable and disempowered members of
society, who arguably need the law’s protection the most, are ironically the least protected in our criminal legal system.26 The vast
majority of sexual assault victims are women, whose unequal
treatment by the law, including skepticism and disbelief of their
accounts during all stages of the criminal process, continues to render them a marginalized group.27
Moreover, women of color and indigenous women are especially
marginalized, because when they report their victimization, the
criminal legal system’s decisionmakers often view them as less
credible.28 The problem of underprosecution of sexual assault is
therefore further exacerbated when considered through the lens of
intersectionality theories, which stress the cumulative impact that
marginalized victims experience as a result of the convergence of
several factors.29 Sexual assault victims are especially prone to discriminatory treatment due to the multiple ways in which gender
and racial biases intersect.30 A single victim may simultaneously
suffer the aggregate effect of these biases and prejudices as a
woman of color, a transgender woman, a sex worker, and an undocumented immigrant, which results in multiplying their marginalization.31
While the law’s biased treatment of socially marginalized individuals disproportionately affects both defendants and victims of
sexual assault, the nuanced interrelationship between the overand underenforcement of these crimes largely remains
25. Tuerkheimer, supra note 24, at 1290–91.
26. See Deborah Tuerkheimer, Criminal Justice and the Mattering of Lives, 116 MICH.
L. REV. 1145, 1146 (2018) (reviewing JAMES FORMAN, JR., LOCKING UP OUR OWN, CRIME
AND PUNISHMENT IN BLACK AMERICA (2017)).
27. See Tuerkheimer, supra note 12, at 20–21. While sexual assault disproportionately
affects women, I do not mean to minimize the experiences of men and transgendered individuals who are sexually assaulted. See Bennett Capers, Real Rape Too, 99 CALIF. L. REV.
1259, 1261–62 (2011).
28. Tuerkheimer, supra note 12, at 29–33.
29. See Kimberle Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics,
and Violence Against Women of Color, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1241, 1271–82 (1991).
30. See Jamie R. Abrams, The #MeToo Movement: An Invitation for Feminist Critique
of Rape Crisis Framing, 52 U. RICH. L. REV. 749, 778–80 (2018).
31. See Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L.
REV. 581, 598–99 (1990).
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undertheorized.32 Existing literature mostly focuses on underpolicing and institutional deficiencies stemming from inadequate criminal investigation.33 The other equally troubling facet of the underenforcement phenomenon—the underprosecution of sexual
assault—has received only scant scholarly attention.34 In this Article, I choose to focus exclusively on this insufficiently studied area
of systemic institutional failure to adequately prosecute sexual assault.
This Article makes two main contributions to existing literature.
First, it asserts that in deciding whether to pursue sexual assault
charges, prosecutors should not rely on the convictability standard.
Assessing evidentiary sufficiency in sexual assault cases through
the lens of a hypothetical jury is misguided because it incorporates
a myriad of jurors’ extralegal considerations of victims’ behaviors,
consisting of racialized, gendered, class, status and other prejudices and biases against victims.35 Declining to prosecute sexual
assault based on the convictability standard not only perpetuates
unwarranted misconceptions about certain victims, but also reinforces their marginalization by exacerbating the legal system’s unequal and discriminatory treatment. Instead, this Article proposes
the reasonable prosecutor’s evidentiary sufficiency standard under
which prosecutors should take into account only legal factors directly relevant to the evidentiary strength of the sexual assault
case at issue.36 This proposed standard asks only whether a reasonable jury could convict the defendant based on the admissible
evidence, rather than predicting whether jurors would likely do so.
To be clear, this Article nowhere suggests that the evidentiary
standard necessary for convicting defendants of sexual assault
should be anything less demanding than beyond a reasonable
doubt. Rather, its modest claim is that prosecutors should objectively evaluate questions of evidentiary sufficiency from the perspective of what reasonable jurors could do. This prescriptive position would ask whether based on the law’s substantive definition
of sexual assault and the likely admissible evidence, whether the

32. For notable works theorizing the underenforcement of sexual assault, see generally
Tuerkheimer, supra note 24; Yung, Rape Law Gatekeeping, supra note 24; Yung, Rape Statistics, supra note 24; Dempsey, supra note 16.
33. See Tuerkheimer, supra note 24; Yung, supra note 24.
34. See Tuerkheimer, supra note 24, at 1288 n.5.
35. See infra section II.B.3.
36. Cf. Dempsey, supra note 16, at 259.
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suspect could and should be found guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt.
Viewed through this normative framework, assessing evidentiary sufficiency through the reasonable prosecutor’s lens carries
broader implications for other underprosecuted crimes beyond sexual assault. While this Article mostly focuses on advocating for reform in the prosecution of sexual assault, it highlights the potential
ramifications on additional crimes. The underprosecution phenomenon is also manifested in other types of crime, most notably unjustified police violence and hate crimes.
Second, this Article uses the underprosecution of sexual assault
as a case study for making broader arguments about prosecutorial
treatment of other underprosecuted crimes and particularly the
roles that progressive prosecutors may play in promoting social
justice goals. It argues that a legal system is fundamentally unjust
if existing criminal institutions fail to do justice for all stakeholders in the criminal process, including not only defendants but also
crime victims. When prosecutors refuse to try sexual assault cases,
they create a system which perpetuates unjust outcomes for persons whom that the law has traditionally failed to protect.
To ensure that prosecutors make charging decisions in a fair and
just manner, this Article develops the Equitable Prosecution Model
(“EPM”).37 Currently there is no scholarly consensus on a principled theory of the prosecutorial role, as the conventional account of
prosecutors’ duty to “seek justice” is amorphous and fails to provide
direction on how to exercise their discretion in making charging
decisions.38
Prosecutors currently lack guidance on how to evaluate contrasting considerations and equitably balance between them. A
more rigorous prosecution of sexual assault would arguably create
an inevitable tension between two conflicting goals: on one hand,
extending the law’s equal protection to sexual assault victims who
have traditionally suffered from the law’s failure to protect them,
and have an interest in holding those who wronged them criminally accountable; on the other hand, rectifying the

37. I borrow the term “equitable prosecution” from Fred C. Zacharias, Justice in Plea
Bargaining 39 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1121, 1160 n.119 (1998).
38. See generally Jeffrey Bellin, Theories of Prosecution, 108 CALIF. L. REV. 1203 (2020).
For further discussion of prosecutor’s role, see infra section III.A.
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disproportionate effects of a racialized criminal legal system on minority defendants, among others in the area of sexual assault.39
This perceived tension between defendants and victims’ interests is manifested in the arguably disparate objectives of two social
movements that have become prominent in recent years: #MeToo
and the Movement for Black Lives (“M4BL” or “BLM”). The former
advocates for enhanced accountability for sexual violence while the
latter urges for remedying the legal system’s longstanding racial
injustice, including the harms of mass incarceration, inflicted disproportionately on racial and ethnic minorities and particularly on
Black, Indigenous, and People of Color (“BIPOC”).40
Conceding that both movements’ calls for reform are warranted,
this Article attempts to reconcile this purported conflict by arguing
that the goals of #MeToo and BLM should in fact be viewed as complementary rather than contradictory. It stresses that the law
must heed the demands of both movements, as they seek to accomplish important social justice objectives by advocating for an equitable legal system and by amplifying voices that have long been
silenced.
Acknowledging that the harms of sexual assault inflicted on
Black victims remain undervalued, adopting the EPM will result
in doing justice and fairly treating both victims and defendants of
crimes. Examining in tandem the nuanced interrelationship between problems of over- and underprosecution of sexual assault
stresses the interconnectedness between defendants’ due process
rights and victims’ interests in ensuring accountability for criminal
wrongdoing, given the criminal legal system’s obligation to provide
fair and just treatment to both groups.
Furthermore, the EPM incorporates a civil rights approach as
underlying the prosecution of sexual assault and other underprosecuted crimes. Drawing on a social justice perspective, this approach recognizes that the law must rigorously protect victims who
historically have suffered from the law’s unequal protection.41 This
approach aligns with a growing number of district attorneys,
39. See GRUBER, supra note 22, at 142, 145.
40. See infra section III.D. I use the terms BLM and M4BL interchangeably, as the
latter is the larger organization that encompasses several local chapters, BLM among them.
See Amna A. Akbar, Toward a Radical Imagination of Law, 93 N.Y.U. L. REV. 405, 407–08
(2018). For discussion of the criminal legal system’s harms on BIPOC communities, see I.
India Thusi, Reality Porn, 96 N.Y.U. L. REV. 738, 786 (2021) (observing that the criminal
legal system marginalizes BIPOC).
41. See Tuerkheimer, supra note 24, at 1334–35.
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commonly referred to as “progressive prosecutors,” who emphasize
concerns about the legal system’s injustices and prioritize the prosecution of crimes, including sex offenses, that exemplify historical
inequality and racial and gender subordination.42 The EPM is compatible with these policies, providing a much needed theoretical
framework for understanding the innovative practices advanced by
these progressive prosecutors.
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I describes the problem of
underprosecution of sexual assault, situating it within the broader
context of the underenforcement phenomenon. It then identifies
the main reasons that account for the failure to prosecute these
crimes. Part II elaborates on the shortcomings of prosecutors’ reliance on the convictability standard for evaluating the sufficiency
of the evidence in sexual assault cases. It proposes replacing it with
the “reasonable prosecutor’s sufficiency of the evidence standard”
under which prosecutors would evaluate, based solely on their professional assessment of the admissible evidence, whether jurors
could and should convict the defendant, that is whether there is a
reasonable possibility of conviction. Part III develops the EPM to
theorize prosecutors’ decision making and their roles in pursuing
criminal charges in traditionally underprosecuted crimes. It
demonstrates how the model’s civil rights underpinning strikes a
proper balance between defendants’ rights and victims’ interests,
thus ultimately leading to a more equitable criminal legal system
for all its stakeholders.
I. THE UNDERPROSECUTION OF SEXUAL ASSAULT
A near consensus has emerged among criminal justice scholars
that the criminal legal system is deeply flawed, mostly due to problems of overcriminalization, overenforcement, and mass incarceration.43 Many refrain from using the term “criminal justice system”

42. See Benjamin Levin, Imagining the Progressive Prosecutor, 105 MINN. L. REV. 1415,
1417, 1438–39 (2020); infra section III.C (elaborating on the role of reformist prosecutors in
prioritizing a civil rights approach to prosecution).
43. Voluminous scholarship has been devoted to the problems of overenforcement and
mass incarceration. See Benjamin Levin, The Consensus Myth in Criminal Justice Reform,
117 MICH. L. REV. 259, 260–61 (2018). See generally JOHN F. PFAFF, LOCKED IN: THE TRUE
CAUSE OF MASS INCARCERATION AND HOW TO ACHIEVE REAL REFORM (2017); MARIE
GOTTSCHALK, THE PRISON AND THE GALLOWS: THE POLITICS OF MASS INCARCERATION IN
AMERICA (2006); RACHEL ELISE BARKOW, PRISONERS OF POLITICS: BREAKING THE CYCLE OF
MASS INCARCERATION (2019).
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due to its failure to do justice, using instead the more descriptive
“criminal legal system” language.44
Furthermore, the criminal legal system’s problems have disparate effects on defendants of color, particularly young Black men. 45
Commentators express profound concerns that existing criminal
institutions function to exert punishment as a means to control and
manage marginalized populations, especially minority communities, perpetuating deeply unjust outcomes.46
Yet, in recent years, commentators also began to critique the
criminal legal system’s failure to adequately enforce specific categories of crime, including unjustified police violence, hate crimes,
and sexual assault.47 Critics further observe that underenforcement has disparate implications for particular groups of victims,
as these crimes are mostly perpetrated against marginalized persons, who have historically suffered from the law’s underprotection.48 In a seminal work that first identified the underenforcement
problem, Professor Alexandra Napatoff stresses that overenforcement and underenforcement are “twin symptoms of a deeper democratic weakness of the criminal legal system: its non-responsiveness to the needs of the poor, racial minorities, and otherwise
politically vulnerable.”49 Other critics further emphasize the inextricable link between the overenforcement of crimes against marginalized defendants, and the underenforcement of specific crimes,
affecting marginalized victims.50

44. See Monica Bell, Stephanie Garlock & Alexander Nabavi-Noori, Towards a
Demosprudence of Poverty, 69 DUKE L.J. 1473, 1475 n.7 (2020).
45. See, e.g., PAUL BUTLER, CHOKEHOLD: POLICING BLACK MEN 7–9, 12, 15–18 (2017);
JAMES FORMAN, LOCKING UP OUR OWN: CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN BLACK AMERICA 8–9,
11–13 (2017); MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE
AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS 1–2 (2020).
46. See ALEXANDER, supra note 45; see also Benjamin Levin, Rethinking the Boundaries
of “Criminal Justice,” 15 OHIO STATE J. CRIM. L. 619, 620 (2018); Sharon Dolovich & Alexandra Natapoff, Mapping the New Criminal Justice Thinking, in THE NEW CRIMINAL
JUSTICE THINKING 1, 2–4 (Sharon Dolovich & Alexandra Natapoff eds., 2017).
47. See Darryl K. Brown, Criminal Enforcement Redundancy: Oversight of Decisions
Not to Prosecute, 103 MINN. L. REV. 843, 857 (2018) (noting that underenforced crimes also
include white collar and corruption cases); Mihailis E. Diamantis, Clockwork Corporations:
A Character Theory of Corporate Punishment, 103 IOWA L. REV. 507, 528–29 (2018) (noting
the same). These crimes implicate different concerns and their victims are not marginalized
but powerful.
48. See Tuerkheimer, supra note 26, at 1154–57; Sarah Swan, Discriminatory Dualism,
54 GA. L. REV. 869, 877–78 (2020).
49. See Natapoff, supra note 23, at 1719, 1722–39 (discussing the various aspects of the
underenforcement problem).
50. See Tuerkheimer, supra note 26, at 1150.
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While voluminous scholarship addresses the criminal legal system’s excesses, parallel problems manifesting its deficits, and particularly the underenforcement of specific crimes, including sexual
assault, largely receive only scant scholarly attention.51 Below, I
demonstrate how the underprosecution of sexual assault represents one important component of the broader underenforcement
phenomenon. 52
A. Underenforcement of Sexual Assault
The criminal legal system’s treatment of sexual assault does not
include any overpunitive practices, such as rigorous pro-arrest,
zealous pro-prosecution or harsh pro-incarceration policies that
characterize the enforcement of most types of violent crime. 53 Instead, the underenforcement of sexual assault offenses is manifested in various stages of the criminal process. First, sexual assault is the most under-reported violent crime, as the vast majority
of victims choose not to report their victimization to the police. 54
Second, the police’s neglect to conduct an effective criminal investigation poses a major impediment to enforcement.55 Third, prosecutorial refusal to file criminal charges once criminal investigation
has been completed results in the underprosecution of sexual assault.56
The underenforcement of sexual assault, however, largely remains underdeveloped in the literature, with the exception of a few
notable works.57 Moreover, the scant scholarship that addresses
51. See supra notes 45–48 and accompanying text.
52. See Natapoff, supra note 23, at 1717 (defining underenforcement as “a weak state
response to lawbreaking as well as to victimization”). Natapoff’s work described several areas characterized by underenforcement, yet it was not specifically focused on underenforcement of sexual assault.
53. See Statistics: Sexual Assault in the United States, NAT’L SEXUAL VIOLENCE RES.
CTR., https://www.nsvrc.org/statistics [https://perma.cc/E33N-CE5S]; see also Laurie S.
Kohn, #MeToo, Wrongs Against Women and Restorative Justice, 28 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y
561, 574 (2019) (observing that sexual assault remains an underprosecuted crime).
54. See Lara Bazelon & Bruce Green, Victims’ Rights from a Restorative Perspective, 17
OHIO STATE J. CRIM. L. 293, 293 (2020) (observing that sexual assaults remain grossly under-reported and underprosecuted).
55. See Tuerkheimer, supra note 24, at 1292–99 (discussing police failure to investigate
sexual assaults); Yung, Rape Law Gatekeeping, supra note 24, at 219–20 (same).
56. Tuerkheimer, supra note 24, at 1289 n.6 (noting that arguments about underenforcement apply both to underpolicing and underprosecution); see Deborah Tuerkheimer,
Beyond #MeToo, 94 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1146, 1158 (2019) (observing that even when police substantiate a rape complaint, prosecutors pursue only a fraction of the cases referred).
57. Tuerkheimer, supra note 24, at 1289 (observing that underenforcement and overenforcement are related problems, both manifesting the state’s implementation of its police
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problems of underenforcement of sexual assault, mostly centers on
problems of underpolicing—police failure to adequately investigate
sexual assault—rather than underprosecution of these crimes.58
This lacuna is unsurprising, for three main reasons.
First, given the near scholarly consensus that the criminal legal
system suffers from problems of excesses in all stages of the criminal process, merely invoking the notion of this system’s deficits is
largely perceived with skepticism. Given ample justified critique of
prosecutorial excessive criminal charging in other areas, deficits in
prosecutions of sexual assault remain less visible.59
Second, one of the distinct features of the American criminal legal system is that prosecutors exercise unregulated discretion during all stages of the criminal process, including among others, in
deciding whether or not to file charges.60 Prosecutors’ authority to
decline to prosecute all types of cases is unlimited and they may
decline to prosecute a specific case for any reason they deem appropriate.61 Moreover, prosecutors’ decisions not to file charges are
unreviewable, and are typically final and not subject to reversal by
anyone outside their offices.62 Prosecutors’ refusal to file sexual assault charges is not perceived differently than their routine declination decisions in other areas.63 Given the inevitable
power in ways that disadvantages the most vulnerable among us, and both undermining
equal protection norms).
58. See Yung, Rape Law Gatekeeping, supra note 24, at 219; Tuerkheimer, supra note
24, at 1292–99; Julie Goldscheid, Rethinking Civil Rights and Gender Violence, 14 GEO. J.
GENDER & L. 43, 46 (2013).
59. Recent advocacy inspired by the #MeToo movement, however, shines some new
light on the problem. See Tuerkheimer, supra note 24; see also infra section III.D (further
discussing the #MeToo movement).
60. See Angela J. Davis, The American Prosecutor: Independence, Power, and the Threat
of Tyranny, 86 IOWA L. REV. 393, 409 (2001); Stephanos Bibas, Prosecutorial Regulation
Versus Prosecutorial Accountability, 157 UNIV. PA. L. REV. 959, 960 (2009); Bruce A. Green
& Fred C. Zacharias, Prosecutorial Neutrality, 2004 WISC. L. REV. 837, 837–38 (2004);
Carissa Byrne Hessick & Michael Morse, Picking Prosecutors, 105 IOWA L. REV. 1537, 1539–
40 (2020); Adam M. Gershowitz, Consolidating Local Criminal Justice: Should Prosecutors
Control the Jails?, 51 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 677, 677 (2016); Erik Luna & Marianne Wade,
Prosecutors as Judges, 67 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1413, 1414–15 (2010). See generally Jeffrey
Bellin, The Power of Prosecutors, 94 N.Y.U. L. REV. 171 (2019) for an argument challenging
the conventional wisdom regarding prosecutorial power.
61. See Gerald E. Lynch, Prosecution Prosecutorial Discretion, in 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
CRIME AND JUSTICE 1248 (Joshua Dressler ed., 2d ed. 2002).
62. See JOSHUA DRESSLER & ALAN C. MICHAELS, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE: ADJUDICATION 115–16 n.6 (4th ed. 2015) (observing that in some states, the
state Attorney General has limited authority, which is rarely exercised, to take jurisdiction
and overrule a nonprosecution decision).
63. See Roth, supra note 17, at 520 (describing prosecutors declining to file charges in
crimes other than sexual assault).
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discretionary power vested in prosecutors, the practice of declining
to bring sexual assault charges is largely viewed as yet another
iteration of this power.64
Third, in recent decades, rape law reformers have largely focused on the need for amending the substantive definition of the
crime, including redefining consent to sexual relationships to include an affirmative consent standard.65 These efforts obfuscated
the limited impact that statutory reforms have for prosecuting sexual assault.66 Since the vast majority of sexual assault cases do not
result in an adjudicative process, these reforms largely have no operative effect.67
The underprosecution of sexual assault, however, is yet another
equally troubling facet of the underenforcement of these crimes.
Conflating prosecutorial declination decisions in sexual assault
cases with prosecutors’ common declination practices in other
crimes obscures the unique ramifications of the underprosecution
of sexual assault, which this Article highlights. The following sections describe existing empirical evidence on this prevalent practice, including the reasons lurking behind it.
B. Prosecutorial Declination Decisions in Sexual Assault Cases
Despite the enormous implications of prosecutorial authority to
refuse to bring criminal charges, the question of under what circumstances prosecutors exercise this unlimited power largely remains open. Elaborating on the broader ramifications of prosecutors’ declination decisions in all types of crime exceeds the scope of
this Article. For the purposes of my argument here, suffice it to
stress that the factors underlying the prosecutorial decision-making process are varied and complex, but mostly understudied. Prosecutors have neither a legal duty to publicly disclose their decisions
64. There are ample social science studies describing the underprosecution of sexual
assault. See infra section I.B for a discussion of these studies. See Tuerkheimer, supra note
12, at 1; Dempsey, supra note 16, at 245–48, for important legal literature addressing the
underprosecution of sexual assault.
65. See Aya Gruber, Consent Confusion, 38 CARDOZO L. REV. 415 (2016). Similarly, rape
law reforms have focused on special evidentiary reforms known as rape shield laws, prohibiting the complainant’s sexual past and allowing evidence of defendant’s previous sexual
assaults in a criminal prosecution for a sexual assault despite the general prohibition
against character evidence when used to prove propensity.
66. See Michal Buchhandler-Raphael, The Failure of Consent: Re-conceptualizing Rape
as Sexual Abuse of Power, 18 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 147, 150 (2011).
67. See id.; see also Erin Sheley, A Broken Windows Theory of Sexual Assault Enforcement, 108 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 455, 465 (2018).
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nor an obligation to publicly state their reasons for declination, resulting in lack of transparency and meaningful oversight.68
Moreover, empirical data on the reasons for prosecutors’ declination decisions are not only scant, but also inherently limited. It
may only cover their stated legal reasons, which do not necessarily
reveal their actual unstated motives that cannot be quantifiably
measured.69 Prosecutors’ declared legal reasons, however, may obscure troubling factors where their decisions are shaped by nonlegal, and mostly pretextual and arbitrary considerations. These include race, gender, class, status, and “other invidious criteria”
which may affect prosecutors’ “choices, either consciously or unconsciously.”70 These unstated reasons for refusing to bring criminal
charges to trial prove especially disconcerting in sexual assault
cases.
Empirical research shows that only a small fraction of sexual
assaults are prosecuted in the criminal legal system.71 Scholars
have long observed that the vast majority of sexual assault cases
are not brought to trial.72 Despite three decades of advocacy calling
for legal reforms in the treatment of sexual assault, these cases
remain underprosecuted today.73

68. See Anna Offit, Prosecuting in the Shadow of the Jury, 113 NW. UNIV. L. REV. 1071,
1082 (2019).
69. See Marc L. Miller & Ronald F. Wright, The Black Box, 94 IOWA L. REV. 125, 129,
133–35, 135 n.20, 145–46, 148–153 (2008) (analyzing data on declinations in four jurisdictions, revealing that the reasons for declinations in one of the jurisdictions (New Orleans)
include those related to criminal procedure, like unlawful searchers, the substance of criminal law, evidentiary problems of proof, particularly when victims and offenders have prior
relationships, victims’ refusal to cooperate, and policy reasons, including chief prosecutors’
offices policies and priorities).
70. Id. at 154–55 (finding that internal regulations have the potential power to affect
prosecutors’ choices and cause them to respond positively to race, class, and other types of
disparities).
71. See Kimberly A. Lonsway & Joanne Archambault, The “Justice Gap” for Sexual Assault Cases: Future Directions for Research and Reform, 18 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 145,
146, 157 (2012) (estimating that for every 100 rapes, only 0.4 to 5.4 are prosecuted); Cassia
Spohn, Dawn Beichner & Erika Davis-Frenzel, Prosecutorial Justifications for Sexual Assault Case Rejection: Guarding the “Gateway to Justice,” 48 SOC. PROBS. 206, 213 (2001)
(noting that prosecutors refused to bring criminal charges in over forty percent of rape
cases); SPOHN & TELLIS, supra note 13, at 17–20 (describing high case attrition in both the
Los Angeles Police Department (“LAPD”) and Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department
(“LASD”)); MORABITO ET AL., supra note 14, at 16–21 (describing the same).
72. See David P. Bryden & Sonja Lengnick, Rape in the Criminal Justice System, 87 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1194, 1195 (1997); Susan Estrich, Rape, 95 YALE L.J. 1087, 1162,
1168 (1986); Kay L. Levine, The Intimacy Discount: Prosecutorial Discretion, Privacy, and
Equality in the Statutory Rape Caseload, 55 EMORY L.J. 691, 726, 729 (2006).
73. See PATRICIA TJADEN & NANCY THOENNES, NAT’L INST. OF JUST., EXTENT, NATURE,
AND CONSEQUENCES OF RAPE VICTIMIZATION: FINDINGS FROM THE NATIONAL VIOLENCE
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Multiple social science studies demonstrate the criminal legal
system’s high rates of attrition underlying all phases of the criminal process in sexual assault cases.74 For example, one study finds
that for every hundred forcible rapes, 5%–20% will be reported,
0.4%–5.4% will be prosecuted, 0.2%–5.2% will result in conviction,
and 0.2%–2.8% will result in incarceration.75
One notable study included quantitative analysis of case attrition from court records, analysis of case files, and interviews with
victims as well as with police and prosecutors (“Sphon and Tellis
Study”).76 It found that the overwhelming majority of reports of
sexual assault do not result in the arrest of a suspect and that only
“about one in four reports was cleared by arrest, one in six resulted
in the filing of charges, and one in seven resulted in a conviction.”77
It further found an overuse of the “exceptional clearance” designation in sexual assault cases; namely instances where law enforcement was unable to clear an offense by arrest, despite conducting
an investigation and identifying a suspect.78
Recent findings from a multijurisdictional study on police officers’ and prosecutors’ decision-making in sexual assault cases (“Morabito Study”) replicate the above findings, revealing substantial
attrition in handling these cases.79 The Morabito Study found that
the attrition problem in sexual assault cases stems from a
AGAINST WOMEN SURVEY 1, 33 (2006) (“[A]mong all women who were raped since age eighteen, only 7.8 percent said their rapist was criminally prosecuted, 3.3 percent said their rapist was convicted of a crime, and a mere 2.2 percent said their rapist was incarcerated.”).
74. Attrition rates in criminal cases are defined as “the rate at which cases are lost or
dropped from the legal process,” beginning with the moment of reporting the offense, continuing with police investigation and then prosecutors’ decision whether to file charges, and
ending in the trial phase which may culminate in sentencing. See Eric R. Carpenter, An
Empirical Look at the Commander Bias in Sexual Assault Cases, 22 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L.
45, 49–51, 56 (2017) (“Attrition is generally studied at six points, and researchers use different data sources to measure attrition at these different points.”).
75. See Lonsway & Archambault, supra note 71, at 156–57 (documenting the attrition of rape allegations as cases progress through the criminal legal system).
76. See SPOHN & TELLIS, supra note 13, at 16–17, 37 (covering sexual assault cases
investigated by the LAPD and LASD).
77. Id. at 404–05 (summarizing the study’s findings, specific to the LASD, on the high
rates of attrition in sexual assault cases).
78. See Cassia Spohn & Katharine Tellis, Justice Denied? The Exceptional Clearance of
Rape Cases in Los Angeles, 74 ALB. L. REV. 1379, 1383, 1394, 1420 (2011) (noting that police
departments reported a clearance rate of 45.7% when the rate of clearance by arrest was
only 12.2%).
79. MORABITO ET AL., supra note 14, at 20–21. The study, which includes interviews
with eighteen sexual assault police investigators and twenty-four prosecutors in six jurisdictions across the country, presents results on case attrition for 2,887 female victims who
reported sexual assault between 2008 and 2010, was submitted to the Department of Justice
in 2019. Id. at 14, 16.
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combination of police investigation barriers—discouraging reporting and failing to conduct effective investigation—and prosecutors’
frequent refusal to bring criminal charges.80 It found that out of
the 2,887 reports that complainants filed with police, only 544
(18.8%) were cleared by arrests, charges were filed only in 363
(72%), and declined in 115 (22.8%).81 In addition, 860 cases (29.8%)
were “exceptionally cleared.”82
These findings show considerable attrition in the early stages of
case processing, with the vast majority of sexual assault reports
not ending in arrest and even fewer going to trial. Only a minority
of sexual assault reports, less than one in five, were cleared by arrest, and only 1.5% of all sexual assault complaints to police ended
in a trial.83 In addition, only 10–15% of cases brought to prosecution resulted in trial before a judge or jury.84 Notably, at least 30%
of cases where it was presumed that probable cause for arrest existed, did not result in arrest but instead were cleared by “exceptional means.”85
The Morabito Study highlights one major problem in prosecutors’ decision-making regarding whether to bring criminal charges,
which is excessive reliance on “exceptional clearance.”86 It confirms
findings from previous studies showing that the designation “exceptional clearance” is more common in rape cases than in other
crimes.87 More specifically, “exceptional clearance” was frequently
used in cases where probable cause existed to make an arrest, yet
one was not made, based on the assessment that prosecutors
thought that they could not win the case at trial.88 The Morabito
study further notes that detectives often believed that they had
solid cases with enough evidence to make an arrest, yet prosecutors declined to bring charges.89 Researchers also found that police
80. See generally id.
81. Id. at 16.
82. Id. at III.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 77–78. The Morabito Study consists of both interviews with police detectives
and with prosecutors. Section VIII focuses on interviews with Assistant District Attorneys,
beginning on page seventy-five of the report.
85. Id. at III (observing that the unfounding of cases was relatively rare, with only 212
cases (7.3%)).
86. Id. at 33.
87. See supra note 73.
88. MORABITO ET AL., supra note 14, at IV; see also SPOHN & TELLIS, supra note 13, at
411–12.
89. MORABITO ET AL., supra note 14, at 69–70; see also Katharine Webster, Why Do So
Few Rape Cases End in Arrest?, UMASS LOWELL (Apr. 17, 2019), https://www.uml.edu/
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detectives made decisions based on their assessments of whether
prosecutors would pursue the case.90
The Spohn and Tellis Study further confirms previous research
findings revealing that “exceptional clearance” is especially prevalent when suspects were not strangers, i.e., in acquaintance rape.91
The main issue in acquaintance rape is whether consent to sex was
obtained.92 Prosecutors frequently decline to file charges in these
cases because they believe that they are not going to be able to
prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt due to jurors’ reluctance to
credit the complainant’s story.93
Additionally, many studies show that underprosecution of sexual assault is especially prevalent when the victims are people of
color.94 Critical race theorist professor Bennett Capers observes
that when crime victims are Black, underenforcement problems
undercut the criminal enforcement of their sexual assault.95 Other
commentators also stress that empirical evidence shows the continued devaluation of Black victims, as notable disparities exist in
rape conviction rates according to the race of the victim, confirming
a bias against minority victims.96 For example, one study demonstrates the impact of both the defendant’s and the victim’s race in
prosecuting sexual assault, showing that their racial composition
was a significant factor in all stages of the criminal process.97

news/stories/2019/sexual_assault_research.aspx [https://perma.cc/D8TY-JXG4]. (“A lot of
times, detectives felt like they had really good, solid cases with enough evidence to make an
arrest, but prosecutors declined to go forward.”).
90. SPOHN & TELLIS, supra note 13, at 94 (noting that prosecutors reviewed all cases in
some sites but only the most difficult cases in others).
91. Id. at 26, 176–77 (noting that prosecutors are less likely to file charges if the victim
knew the offender).
92. Id. at 143–44.
93. Id. at 130–34 (providing quantitative analysis of case attrition in sexual assault
cases from court records).
94. See GARY LAFREE, RAPE AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE: THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF
SEXUAL ASSAULT 129–33, 134–43 (1989).
95. See I. Bennett Capers, Race, Policing, and Technology, 95 N.C. L. REV. 1241, 1253–
54 (2017).
96. See Tania Tetlow, Discriminatory Acquittals, 18 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 75, 88–
90 (2009).
97. See generally Jessica Shaw & HaeNim Lee, Race and the Criminal Justice System
Response to Sexual Assault, 64 AM. J. CMTY. PSYCH. 256 (2019). For an earlier study confirming these findings, see LAFREE, supra note 94, at 129–33, finding that even though
Black men accused of assaulting Black women accounted for 45% of reported rapes, they
only accounted for 17% of defendants who received sentences of six years or more; in contrast, Black men charged with assaulting white women accounted for 50% of men who received sentences of six or more years.
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But prior studies found that the influence of race on the criminal
legal system’s response to sexual assault has been described as
“mixed,” “inconsistent”, and containing “contradictions.” A recent
systemic review of prior studies, (“Shaw and Lee Study”) attempted to explain the disagreement in prior studies about how
race influences sexual assault cases progression. It found that
prior findings in fact unite to tell a nuanced story of the role of race
in the criminal legal system response to sexual assault.
The Shaw and Lee Study examined eighteen studies concerning
the decision to file charges initially, the decision to pursue charges
rather than dismiss them, or the severity of the charges filed. 98
Some found that sexual assault cases involving “[w]hite” victims
were more likely to have charges filed as compared to “non‐[w]hite”
and “Black” victims.99 “Black” suspects, in general, as well as
“Black” suspects with “white” victims were more likely to be
charged with more serious crimes and for the charges to be filed as
felonies.100 However, a couple of studies have found that “white”
victims, generally, and “white” victims with “Black” suspects, specifically, are more likely to have charges dismissed as compared to
“Black” victims, and other racial dyads, respectively.101 The authors explained the purported disparity, suggesting that prosecutors initially issue charges on more cases involving white victims
and suspects of color, but later when it becomes clear that there is
not a strong enough case for it to proceed to prosecution, the
charges are dropped.102
Other studies found that in cases of aggravated rape, involving
a stranger perpetrator, a gun or knife, or collateral injuries to the
victim, race played a more prominent role.103 Race continued to
have no effect on charging decisions in cases of simple rape.104 Researchers explained that this suggested that prosecutors believed
that the seriousness of the crime was enhanced when the victim
was white and that the race of the victim might have been itself an
aggravating factor.105

98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.

See Shaw & Lee, supra note 97, at 272.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 272–73.
Id. at 260.
Id.
Id. at 273.
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C. Reasons for Refusal to Prosecute
Critically evaluating the underprosecution of sexual assault
calls for probing into the reasons underlying prosecutors’ declination decisions. To be sure, when prosecutors decide not to file
charges because in their professional opinion there is genuinely not
enough evidence to allow a reasonable jury to convict a defendant
beyond a reasonable doubt, there is no basis for casting doubt on
their decisions.106 This Article thus takes no issue with these cases.
Rather, it argues that when prosecutors’ declinations are motivated by concerns that juries might not convict the defendant because they might rely on biases and prejudices concerning the victim, namely meritless factors that are not directly related to
genuine legal insufficiencies of the evidence, challenging these decisions becomes vital.
The difficulties of unveiling the actual reasons behind prosecutors’ declination decisions are not distinct to sexual assault cases,
because prosecutors rely on unstated reasons in other types of
cases as well.107 Yet, the problem is exacerbated in the area of sexual assault because unlike other crimes which are overprosecuted,
the vast majority of sexual assault cases are declined for prosecution. Assessing the various reasons for the refusal to try sexual assault cases is especially challenging because prosecutors often
openly state one reason, most commonly the designation “insufficient evidence,” when other unstated, and mostly pretextual reasons, underlie their declination decisions. The main considerations
underlying both prosecutors’ stated and unstated reasons for refusing to pursue sexual assault charges largely fall under the four
categories below.
1. The Convictability Standard
The social science studies discussed earlier confirm that the
main reason underlying prosecutors’ declinations in sexual assault
cases are their subjective assessment of the low likelihood that juries will convict.108 Under the “convictability standard,”
106. See Miller & Wright, supra note 69, at 147–48 (observing that prosecutorial declination decisions largely stem from fundamental legal requirements).
107. See supra section I.B.
108. See MORABITO ET AL., supra note 14, at 77 (observing that prosecutors take cases
forward that present a very high likelihood of a guilty disposition); Dawn Beichner & Cassia
Spohn, Prosecutorial Charging Decisions in Sexual Assault Cases: Examining the Impact of
a Specialized Prosecution Unit, 16 CRIM. JUST. POL’Y REV. 461, 488–89 (2005) (noting that
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prosecutors consider not only whether, based on the evidence, jurors could convict, but also whether they would be likely do so.109
Put differently, prosecutors decide whether to bring sexual assault
charges based on their assessment of the likelihood that jurors
would convict; that is, whether they “belie[ve] that the case would
likely result in a conviction at trial.”110
Likewise, prosecutors’ refusal to file charges is often based on
their predictions that jurors are unlikely to convict.111 In interviews conducted with prosecutors, they emphasized the need to
pursue only cases that would most likely reach a guilty verdict. 112
They further conceded that they made decisions in anticipation of
how they believed a jury would respond to the evidence. These
studies demonstrate that prosecutors deliberately pursue only a
few strong cases in which they are persuaded that there is high
probability that jurors would convict, screening out cases where
conviction is unlikely.113 Using this prediction for measuring the
perceived strength of the case often leads prosecutors to conclude
that there is insufficient evidence to pursue the charges.114
One factor that prosecutors frequently rely on in predicting low
likelihood of conviction in sexual assault cases is commonly known
as the “CSI effect.”115 The “CSI effect” refers to a perception that
jurors are unlikely to convict a defendant without DNA evidence.116
Such evidence, however, is not legally required for conviction in
sexual assault cases and is merely a self-imposed constraint.117
a multijurisdictional study shows that prosecutors select cases with high probability of conviction and reject charges in case where conviction is unlikely).
109. See Tuerkheimer, supra note 12, at 37–38. The term “convictability” was first coined
in Lisa Frohmann, Convictability and Discordant Locals: Reproducing Race, Class, and
Gender Ideologies in Prosecutorial Decisionmaking, 31 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 531, 535 (1997).
110. Tuerkheimer, supra note 12, at 37.
111. See MORABITO ET AL., supra note 14, at V, 8.
112. Id.
113. See Biechner & Spohn, supra note 108, at 488–91.
114. See Dempsey, supra note 16, at 245.
115. See First Amended Class Action Complaint, supra note 11, para. 56 (describing the
District Attorney’s refusal to charge sexual assault cases based on the perception that juries
are unlikely to convict without forensic evidence).
116. The CSI effect is defined as the inflated jury expectations regarding evidentiary
proof that relies on forensic evidence and the resulting increase in prosecution’s burden of
proof. See generally Kimberlianne Podlas, “The CSI Effect”: Exposing the Media Myth, 16
FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 429, 433 (2006).
117. See Heather Waltker, Gerald Laporte, Danielle Weiss, Dawn Schwarting, Minh
Nguyen & Frances Scott, Sexual Assault Cases: Exploring the Importance of Non-DNA Evidence in Sexual Assault Cases, NAT’L INST. OF JUST. (Nov. 9, 2017), https://nij.ojp.gov/topics/articles/sexual-assault-cases-exploring-importance-non-dna-forensic-evidence [https://p
erma.cc/TG2E-DVYM].
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Moreover, studies document a substantial backlog in testing forensic sexual assault examinations (“rape kits”).118
Sufficient evidence for conviction of sexual assault, however,
may largely rely on complainants’ testimonies at trial, provided
that jurors find them credible. Victims’ accounts may be buttressed
with non-DNA corroborative evidence consisting of witnesses who
observed the complainant before and after the assault, electronic
communications, and photographs.119
Heavy reliance on DNA evidence in prosecutors’ decision making
is especially problematic given the fact that in acquaintance rapes,
where the defendant typically defends this charge on the ground
that the sexual encounter was consensual, such evidence should
not be considered a dispositive factor in deciding whether to prosecute the case.120 This Article will return to elaborate on the drawbacks in the convictability standard in the Part II,121 but before
doing that, it will continue to outline additional reasons underlying
prosecutors’ declination decisions.
2. The Credibility Discount
Prosecutors’ declination decisions in many sexual assault cases
are problematic because in doing so they unjustifiably discredit
complainants’ accounts.122 Crediting witnesses for telling the truth
at trial, sometimes referred to as believability, is a key tenet underpinning discussions of evidentiary issues in all legal proceedings.123 While credibility concerns are not unique to sexual assault
118. See Tuerkheimer, supra note 12, at 34–35.
119. Id. at 9–10.
120. See Tamara F. Lawson, Before the Verdict and Beyond the Verdict: The CSI Infection
Within Modern Criminal Jury Trials, 41 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 119, 136–37 (2009) (describing
the CSI effect as the jury’s perception of the enormous power of forensic science evidence in
in rape cases).
121. See infra section II.B.
122. See Tuerkheimer, supra note 12, at 17–20; MORABITO ET AL., supra note 14, at 85.
For a recent excellent work on the complexities of sexual assault victims’ credibility, see
generally DEBORAH TUERKHEIMER, CREDIBLE: WHY WE DOUBT ACCUSERS AND PROTECT
ABUSERS 2–3 (2021) (elaborating on how the credibility complex, driven by cultural assumptions and misconceptions about victims and accusers, and legal interpretation and procedures that embed the discounting of credibility, results in distorted decision-making that
results in disbelieving accusers).
123. Credibility and truth telling, however, are not mutually exclusive, as witnesses may
tell the truth yet not be believed or may tell lies and still be believed. See Julia Simon-Kerr,
Uncovering Credibility, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF LAW AND THE HUMANITIES 583, 586
(Simon Stern et al. eds., 2020); see also Kimberly Kessler Ferzan, #BelieveWomen and the
Presumption of Innocence: Clarifying the Questions for Law and Life 2–3, 20–21 (May 2020)
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cases, they are further compounded in this particular area. One of
the main obstacles underlying the criminal legal system’s treatment of sexual assault is decisionmakers’ disbelief and judgment
of sexual assault complainants during the various phases of the
criminal process, beginning with police officers’ suspicion, continuing with prosecutors’ hesitancy, and ending with jurors’ skepticism.124
The problem of disbelieving victims of sexual assault is augmented by the fact that the underlying reasons for this phenomenon often stem from biases and prejudices.125 Using the term “credibility discount” to refer to an “unwarranted failure to credit an
assertion where this failure stems from prejudice,” Professor Deborah Tuerkheimer describes the ways that law enforcement officers downgrade the trustworthiness and plausibility of victims’ accounts, which in turn influences prosecutorial declination
decisions.126
Additionally, the credibility discount is inextricably intertwined
with the convictability standard discussed above. Declination decisions encompass not only a prosecutor’s own skepticism about the
case’s strength, but also the anticipated skepticism of a hypothetical jury that will likely downgrade the victim’s credibility.127 In
some cases, prosecutors explicitly tell sexual assault victims that
while they believe them, they do not think that a jury is likely to
convict.128
Furthermore, a host of other extralegal factors, consisting
mostly of prejudices and biases, play a prevalent role in prosecutors’ declination decisions, explaining the high attrition rates in
sexual assault cases. The social studies described earlier demonstrate that prosecutors are more prone to express skepticism of victims’ accounts when the latter engaged in what prosecutors perceive as “risk-taking behaviors,” including alcohol and drug use
prior to the sexual assault.129 The studies show that sexual assault
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with the University of Virginia School of Law) (discussing
the claims underlying the demand to believe alleged sexual assault victims).
124. See Tuerkheimer, supra note 12, at 27–41.
125. Id. at 29–30; see also supra note 75.
126. See Tuerkheimer, supra note 12, at 3.
127. Id.
128. See Petition for Appointment of a Prosecutor Pro Tempore, supra note 11, at *10
(describing the prosecutor’s letter to the complainant notifying her of the decision not to file
a charge against the suspect). The prosecutor further explained that he believed the complainant but did not think that a jury was likely to convict the suspect. Id.
129. See Biechner & Spohn, supra note 108, at 489–90.
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cases that were not prosecuted following the “exceptional clearance” designation were often associated with the fact that the victims were drinking alcohol prior to the alleged assault.130 These
cases were often rejected at the initial stage, namely, screened out
pre-arrest, because victims’ “risk-taking behaviors” were considered challenging to the prosecution due to credibility concerns.131
The dangerous cumulative effect of the convictability standard
and the credibility discount is illustrated in the infamous Missouri
case involving the sexual assault of Daisy Coleman.132 In January
2012, then fourteen-year-old Daisy and a thirteen-year-old friend
snuck out of Daisy’s house and were picked up by then seventeenyear-old Matthew Barnett, and some other boys, who took them to
Barnett’s house.133 Daisy told investigators that she was given a
clear liquid before Barnett raped her while another boy recorded
the act on his cellphone.134 The suspects then left the unconscious,
intoxicated Daisy barefoot on her house’s porch, in freezing temperatures.135 Barnett admitted to having sex with Daisy but said it
was consensual.136 Shockingly, the prosecutor read Daisy her Miranda rights before she answered questions about her assault, in
an unusual tactic that epitomizes decision-makers’ typical suspicion and disbelief of rape victims.137 The prosecutors eventually decided not to pursue the sexual assault charges, citing insufficient
evidence, after estimating that a jury would be unlikely to convict
the suspect of raping Daisy who accompanied him to his house and
voluntarily consumed alcohol.138 Instead, the prosecutors agreed to
130. See MORABITO ET AL., supra note 14, at 25.
131. Id. at 26–27.
132. The details of the alleged sexual assault of Daisy Coleman are described in the Netflix documentary Audrey and Daisy, NETFLIX, (2016), https://www.netflix.com/watch/800
97321?trackid=13752289&tctx=0%2C0%2C5c2343 [https://perma.cc/U76R-EYVL].
133. Id.
134. Dugan Arnett, Nightmare in Maryville: Teens’ Sexual Encounter Ignites a Firestorm
Against Family, KAN. CITY STAR, https://www.kansascity.com/news/special-reports/mary
ville/article329412/Nightmare-in-Maryville-Teens’-sexual-encounter-ignites-a-firestormagainst-family.html [https://perma.cc/CG8A-6B65] (June 19, 2018, 2:59 PM).
135. See Allie Jones, Prosecutor Read Daisy Coleman Her Miranda Rights When She Reported Her Rape, THE ATLANTIC (Mar. 7, 2014), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive
/2014/03/prosecutor-read-daisy-coleman-her-miranda-rights-when-she-reported-her-rape/
358952/ [https://perma.cc/XMR5-86VN].
136. Arnett, supra note 134.
137. Jones, supra note 135.
138. Robert Rice, the Nodaway County prosecutor who declined to file charges against
the alleged attackers referred to the case as a “case of ‘incorrigible teenagers’ drinking alcohol and having sex,” saying that “[t]hey were doing what they wanted to do, and there
weren’t any consequences. And it’s reprehensible. But is it criminal? No.” See Arnett, supra
note 134.
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a plea agreement under which Barnett pled guilty to a misdemeanor child endangerment charge and was sentenced to two
years of probation and a four-month suspended jail term.139 In August 2020, when Daisy was twenty-three years old, she committed
suicide, after coping with the aftermath of this traumatic experience for eight years.140
3. Uncooperative Victims
While convictability and credibility are mostly tacit reasons underlying prosecutors’ charging decisions, two stated reasons further account for declination decisions in sexual assault cases. The
first concerns victims’ noncooperation with the prosecution. Interviews with prosecutors reveal that this may involve either active
refusal to cooperate, where victims explicitly state that they do not
wish to pursue prosecution, or passive noncooperation, where victims do not respond to prosecutors’ reaching out to them or fail to
appear for interviews.141 Prosecutors further note that noncooperation is especially prevalent where the offender and the victim
were acquainted. In many cases where the offender and victim
were acquainted, they are in a domestic relationship, which prosecutors estimate account for about fifty percent of sexual assault
cases.142
Sexual assault victims’ unwillingness to engage in the criminal
process raises broader issues pertaining to the public’s general
mistrust of law enforcement. Minority communities, and BIPOC in
particular, express ample concerns about racialized policing and
the disparate effects of police brutality on Black people.143 Further
elaborating on these problems exceeds the scope of this Article. For
purposes of the discussion here, suffice it to say that many victims
are reluctant to partake in the coercive power of the carceral state,
when their participation results in the incarceration of their intimate partner or acquaintance.144 This Article will revisit the implications of victims’ refusal to cooperate with prosecutors and the
possible tension between victims’ and states’ interests in Part III,
139. Jones, supra note 135.
140. Daisy Coleman: Assault Survivor in Netflix Film Takes Own Life, BBC NEWS (Aug.
5, 2020), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-53673192 [https://perma.cc/VLF6-5C
PR].
141. See MORABITO ET AL., supra note 14, at 85.
142. See id. at 80–81, 84.
143. See, e.g., BUTLER, supra note 45, at 2–7.
144. See, e.g., id. at 2.
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when proposing an equitable prosecution theory to underpin the
prosecutor’s role in charging decisions.145
4. Efficient Allocation of Limited Resources
Prosecutors stress the need to screen out cases due to efficacy
concerns and limited resource availability as among their reasons
for not bringing sexual assault charges.146 Carefully managing
scarce resources implicates general institutional considerations
that are not unique to the prosecution of sexual assault. Insufficient resources and other organizational constraints similarly limit
prosecutors’ charging decisions in all other areas of criminal prosecution, forcing them to balance the costs and benefits of moving
forward with any distinct case.
Arguably, factoring in efficacy and efficiency considerations is a
legitimate prosecutorial policy choice, which may appear unproblematic at first sight. Yet these choices become more problematic
in sexual assault cases given the unique challenges embedded in
trying them. The complexities underlying sexual assault prosecutions might incentivize prosecutors, even unconsciously, to decline
close cases, favoring prosecutions of easier and less nuanced cases.
Prosecutorial choices that are conceived as resource driven,
however, disguise a host of value-laden priorities which are anything but neutral. The refusal to prosecute controversial sexual assault cases expresses profoundly normative societal messages
about which values, and whose interests, matter more than others.
Without minimizing the significance of efficient allocation of
scarce public resources, I submit that it is merely one factor that
must be balanced against competing normative considerations,
which will be further elaborated upon in the next part.
II. REJECTING THE CONVICTABILITY STANDARD
Having identified the convictability standard as the main reason
underlying prosecutors’ reluctance to try sexual assault cases, this
Article now turns to criticize this test for its flaws and unintended
consequences, and proposes an alternative evidentiary standard in
its stead.

145.
146.

See infra section III.D.
See MORABITO ET AL., supra note 14, at 77, 92.
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A more robust prosecution of sexual assault, as I propose in this
Article, requires rejecting prosecutors’ practice of predicting the
low likelihood of conviction through the lens of a hypothetical jury.
Prosecutors should not use charging criteria that is grounded in
predictive assessments of imaginary jurors’ perceptions of the case.
Instead, prosecutors should make charging decisions in sexual assault cases based solely on their own assessment of the sufficiency
of the evidence in any given case, as the following discussion suggests.
A. The Debate Over the Controlling Evidentiary Standard
A general problem characterizing prosecutors’ decision-making
processes in all criminal cases concerns ambiguity in how they
ought to evaluate the sufficiency of the evidence in particular
cases. In exercising their discretionary power to decide whether to
pursue charges once police investigation had been completed, prosecutors must identify the quantum of evidence that is sufficient for
prosecution.147 The controlling standard was established by the Supreme Court of the United States in Bordernkircher v. Hayes,
which held that the decision whether to file charges rests entirely
within the prosecutor’s discretion “so long as the prosecutor has
probable cause to believe that the accused committed an offense
defined by statute . . . .”148
This standard prohibits prosecutors from filing charges without
sufficient evidence to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, and
establishes that disregarding this mandate amounts to violation of
their professional duty.149 But other than that, the decision sets a
fairly low threshold of “probable cause” for evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence in making charging decisions. Beyond this
indeterminate prerequisite, neither Bordernkircher nor subsequent decisions offer any concrete guidance to prosecutors on how
to assess ex ante evidentiary sufficiency in distinct cases.150
Likewise, commentators are unable to reach a consensus on how
prosecutors ought to assess evidentiary sufficiency. They observe
that “[t]he academic literature reflects vigorous disagreement
147. See Bellin, supra note 38, at 1221.
148. 434 U.S. 357, 364 (1978).
149. See id.; cf. Zacharias, supra note 37, at 1149–51 (discussing the prosecutor’s duty to
do justice in plea bargains).
150. See Bennett L. Gershman, The Prosecutor’s Duty to Truth, 14 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS
309, 337 (2001).
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about how convinced of guilt prosecutors should be before bringing
or continuing charges.”151 In general, prosecutors may choose between two alternatives when making charging decisions in most
crimes: they may either refer close cases to the jury’s decision or
proceed only in cases where they subjectively believe that the suspect is guilty.152
The absence of an agreed-upon standard under which prosecutors ought to evaluate evidentiary sufficiency proves especially
problematic in the context of sexual assault prosecutions. Commentators observe that in many controversial areas, prosecutors
often attempt to be appealing to juries’ perceptions, especially
when societal attitudes towards the specific crime are perceived as
divisive, which is often the case when prosecutions implicate historically fraught social and political issues.153 Similarly, sexual assault prosecutions exemplify one of these areas. Unique concerns
arise in this context because unlike most other crimes, prosecutors
do not refer close cases to the jury’s decision. Instead, they decline
to file charges because they predict that the likelihood that a hypothetical jury will convict the defendant is low.154 Using an imagined jury’s potential reaction to a case to shape prosecutors’ charging decisions is fraught with difficulties, as I suggest below.
B. Problems with the Convictability Standard
The following discussion explains what is wrong with prosecutors’ reliance on the convictability standard, as measured through
the perspective of a hypothetical jury. But one preliminary clarification regarding the contours of my argument is necessary before
proceeding. The assumption underlying my argument for rejecting
the convictability standard is that sufficient evidence to support
the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt is, and ought to
remain, a necessary prerequisite to filing criminal charges. Concededly, any other standard that falls short of this stringent yet
fundamental requirement would be unconstitutional.
Yet, the phrase “sufficient evidence,” is hardly self-explanatory.
It leaves open the question of how prosecutors should determine

151. Fred C. Zacharias & Bruce A. Green, The Duty to Avoid Wrongful Convictions: A
Thought Experiment in the Regulation of Prosecutors, 89 B.U. L. REV. 1, 50 (2009).
152. Bellin, supra note 38, at 1221.
153. Avlana Eisenberg, Expressive Enforcement, 61 UCLA L. REV. 858, 893 (2014).
154. See supra section I.C.1 (discussing the convictability standard).
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what types of evidence are considered sufficient in particular cases.
Prosecutors’ charging decisions implicate not merely a qualitative
and quantitative assessment of the evidence. Instead, evaluating
evidentiary sufficiency is a value-laden task that incorporates a
host of implicit societal assumptions, embedding biases, and prejudices about how the complainant’s and the defendant’s testimonies would likely be perceived by the jury at trial. Measuring convictability through the jury’s lens is inappropriate because
prosecutors are applying a higher, more onerous standard than legal sufficiency of the evidence in order to decide whether to proceed
with the charges.
The scope of my argument is thus limited to criticizing prosecutors’ understanding of how to evaluate what amounts to sufficient
evidence. A prosecutor’s mere prediction that a hypothetical jury is
unlikely to convict does not, and should not, mean that the evidence is in fact insufficient to prove guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt. While genuine problems of insufficiency of evidence should
result in prosecutors’ refusal to file charges, perceived difficulties
concerning how hypothetical jurors are likely to react to the case
should not. The convictability standard is wrong precisely because
it rests on misperceived rather than genuine evaluations of legal
sufficiency. The subsections below further elaborate on why prosecutors’ reliance on such a standard is misguided.
1. Relinquishing Prosecutors’ Discretion to a Hypothetical Jury
Exercising prosecutorial discretion on whether and what
charges should be brought in distinct cases is an integral part of
prosecutors’ professional duty.155 A critical component of this duty
includes assessing the relevant considerations underlying charging decisions according to legal standards. Prosecutors’ decisions
about whether to file sexual assault charges thus ought to be
grounded on the legal merits of the case, including the evaluation
of substantive, procedural, and evidentiary questions as a matter
of law.156 Furthermore, prosecutors’ charging decisions ought to be
based on key fundamental values, including independency, a

155. See Bellin, supra note 38, at 1212, 1223.
156. See generally Dempsey, supra note 16, at 251 (discussing in further detail the benefits of such a merit-based standard).
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principled and consistent decision-making process, and transparency.157
The refusal to file sexual assault charges due to deference to an
imagined jury’s perception of the evidentiary strength of the case
is improper because by doing that, prosecutors effectively relinquish their autonomous power to exercise professional discretion
on whether and what charges should be brought.158 The problem
with this decision-making process is that prosecutors fail to exercise their own professional, legal evaluation of the case’s evidentiary strength.
Prosecutors’ duty to independently assess ex ante evidentiary
sufficiency should not be deferred to the jury. Prosecutors cannot
abrogate their professional discretion by replacing it with predictive assumptions about hypothetical jurors who have yet to hear
the evidence.159 Unlike the grand jury, whose role is to decide
whether probable cause for commission of the crime exists, the
trial jury’s role is to determine, after all the evidence has been introduced, whether guilt has been proven beyond a reasonable
doubt.160 The trial jury’s factual determinations regarding the sufficiency of the evidence and the credibility of the witnesses cannot
be presupposed based on prosecutors’ mere predictions and ought
to be reserved for the final stage of the criminal process.
Moreover, the infrequency of jury trials161 further supports the
argument that prosecutors should not substitute hypothetical jurors’ perception of sexual assault cases with their own legal assessment of the cases’ evidentiary sufficiency. The dominance of plea
agreements in the criminal legal system provides a compelling reason why prosecutors’ charging decisions should not hinge on measuring convictability through the lens of a hypothetical jury.162 The
fact that the vast majority of sexual assault cases never reaches a
jury, and thus a trial jury verdict is unlikely to happen, casts doubt
on prosecutors’ deference to an imagined jury’s perspective.163
157. See Green & Zacharias, supra note 60, at 843, 846–47, 861–62.
158. See Dempsey, supra note 16, at 250.
159. See Offit, supra note 68, at 1111–12.
160. See Kevin K. Washburn, Restoring the Grand Jury, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 2333, 2359
(2008).
161. For an excellent critique of the legal system’s heavy reliance on plea agreements,
see CARISSA BYRNE HESSICK, PUNISHMENT WITHOUT TRIAL: WHY PLEA BARGAINING IS A BAD
DEAL (Abrams Press, New York, 2021).
162. See Offit, supra note 68, at 1079 (“[O]nly 2% of defendants with felony convictions
were tried by juries.”).
163. See Dempsey, supra note 16, at 245–48.
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Prosecutorial reliance on a hypothetical jury’s evaluation of the evidence, including the likelihood that the jury would believe the
complainant’s testimony, is misguided because in eventuality, juries rarely play a role in deciding the defendant’s guilt. 164
2. Interjecting Non-Legally Mandated Factors
Another problem with the convictability standard is that juries’
perceptions of sexual assault cases are not based solely on their
legal merits. Instead, juries rely on various factors that are not legally mandated, including corroboration of the complainant’s account.165 Evidence law today poses less legal challenges to prosecuting sexual assault in the absence of corroboration, since the
common law’s requirement that complainants’ testimonies be corroborated by additional evidence has largely been abolished in
most jurisdictions.166 Despite the fact that corroboration is not legally mandated under most sexual assault laws, prosecutors are
often reluctant to pursue sexual assault charges in the absence of
such evidence, because they predict that jurors are unlikely to convict.167
Juries’ persistent quest for corroboration of the complainant’s
account proves especially problematic in acquaintance rapes,
which hinge on whether the complainant consented to sex and
164. Some argue that prosecutors ought to incorporate jurors’ perception of given cases,
even if the likelihood of a jury trial is low. Arguably, prosecutors’ accounting for hypothetical
jurors’ perspective on the question of whether to bring charges is important because hypothetical jurors’ viewpoints practically shape prosecutors’ decisions. See, e.g., Offit, supra
note 68, at 1079, 1088–89, 1093. Yet, there are good reasons to cast doubt on the desirability
of heavily incorporating hypothetical jurors’ perceptions of cases from a normative standpoint, as I further elaborate below.
165. See Tuerkheimer, supra note 12, at 7, 41 (observing that credibility discounting
compounds the prosecution of sexual assault, given the assumption that jurors are unlikely
to convict based on the complainant’s testimony alone); Kimberly Kessler Ferzan, #WeToo,
45 FLA. STATE L. REV. (forthcoming 2022) (observing that even without a legally required
corroboration requirement, prosecutors opt not to charge in the absence of corroboration).
166. See TUERKHEIMER, CREDIBLE, supra note 122, at 92–95 (elaborating on the historical development of rape law’s corroboration requirement and noting that some jurisdictions
included a so-called cautionary instruction directing the jury to evaluate the complainant’s
testimony with extra suspicion); Michelle J. Anderson, Prompt Complaint Requirement,
Corroboration Requirements, and Cautionary Instructions in Campus Sexual Assault, 84
B.U. L. REV. 945, 964 (2004) (discussing the current status of the corroboration, prompt
complaint and cautionary instruction requirements); see also SPOHN & TELLIS, supra note
13, at 174 (noting that rape law reforms focused on removal of the corroboration requirement, though in some jurisdictions, this requirement remains intact).
167. See Dempsey, supra note 16, at 245; see also Ferzan, supra note 165 (“[E]ven without a legally required corroboration requirement, prosecutors opt not to charge in the absence of corroborating evidence.”).
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whether the suspect knew or should have known about such nonconsent.168 Nonconsensual sex in these cases is mostly accomplished without use of physical force, leaving no physical traces as
evidence.169 Likewise, complainants’ resistance often consists of
only verbal, rather than physical resistance. Most jurisdictions
have long abolished the physical resistance requirement, making
verbal resistance, namely, lack of consent, sufficient for conviction.170
Yet, juries continue to rely on physical evidence to corroborate
complainants’ testimonies that they did not consent.171 Such reliance, however, is not legally mandated.172 The fact that the key
piece of evidence consists only of the complainant’s account does
not demonstrate a genuine evidentiary deficiency from a legal
standpoint.173 That testimony, if believed by the jury, is in itself
sufficient to establish the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt.174 The jury remains free to decide that the complainant’s
testimony is not credible and acquit the defendant. Juries routinely
engage in deciding whose testimony is more credible in all other
contexts, and sexual assault cases should not be treated differently.175 Yet, juries treat complainants’ accounts with deep skepticism, dismissing them as “he said, she said,” which results in concluding that the evidence is “insufficient.”176
The problem with prosecutors’ prediction that juries are likely
to view the evidence as “insufficient” is that it is not grounded in
legally based assessments that the evidence is indeed legally

168. See Beichner & Spohn, supra note 108, at 488–89.
169. See MORABITO ET AL., supra note 14, at 86–87 (observing that in many sexual assault cases, corroborating evidence is often lacking).
170. See Richard Klein, An Analysis of Thirty-Five Years of Rape Reform: A Frustrating
Search for Fundamental Fairness, 41 AKRON L. REV. 981, 987–89 (2008).
171. See Tuerkheimer, supra note 12, at 23–24.
172. See generally, TUERKHEIMER, CREDIBLE, supra note 122, at 44–49, 60–69, 92–95
(discussing the way rape law’s physical resistance requirement is no longer legally mandated, but juries often find evidence of physical resistance helpful and insist on an unreasonable demand for corroboration).
173. Id. at 68 (“[I]n the courtroom, victim testimony about what happened is evidence—
often, it is the most powerful evidence of all.”).
174. Id. at 10–11 (observing that in many cases, additional evidence corroborates the
complainant’s account, including, among others, electronic evidence like text messages).
175. See generally Teneille R. Brown, The Affective Blindness of Evidence Law, 89 DENV.
U. L. REV. 47, 89–90 (2011) (discussing the various ways that jurors assess credibility and
choose whom to believe); Ferzan, supra note 165 (describing juries’ discrediting sexual victims’ accounts).
176. See Yan, supra note 9 (referencing the jury’s acquittal of the defendant in the
Hunter Morgan case).
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insufficient due to genuine problems with the believability of the
complainant’s account. Instead, prosecutors’ refusal to pursue sexual assault charges are guised as problems of evidentiary sufficiency when in actuality, they incorporate non-legally mandated
factors, namely, extra legal considerations.
This problem is poignantly illustrated in the infamous sexual
assault case against former comedian Bill Cosby. The recent decision of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court177 to acquit Cosby of sexually assaulting Andrea Constand highlights the problem of prosecutorial declination to bring sexual assault charges to trial based
on a questionable assessment that the case could not be won at
trial as well as the problem of prosecutor’s reliance on extra legal
considerations in making charging decisions.178
The refusal to bring sexual assault charges following Andrea
Constand’s 2005 complaint stems from then District Attorney of
Montgomery County, Pennsylvania Bruce Castor examination of
the investigation file conducted by police leading to his subsequent
conclusion that “there was insufficient credible and admissible evidence upon which any charge against Cosby related to the Constand incident could be proven beyond a reasonable doubt.”179
Then D.A. Castor offered several reasons to support his decision
to decline to prosecute the case. First, the chief prosecutor believed
that Constand’s delay in promptly filing a complaint against Cosby
diminished the reliability of her later recollections.180 Second, and
relatedly, the prosecutor believed that such delay undermined the
investigators’ efforts to collect forensic evidence.181 Third, the prosecutor identified a number of inconsistencies in Constand’s various
177. Commonwealth v. Cosby, 252 A.3d 1092 (Pa. 2021).
178. Ten years later, the initial declination decision was reversed as another District
Attorney decided to bring charges in the case. In 2015, Cosby was arrested on charges that
he had drugged and sexually assaulted Andrea Constand at his home in the Philadelphia
suburbs 11 years earlier. In April 2018, the jury convicted Mr. Cosby of three counts of aggravated indecent assault against Ms. Constand. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court acquitted Cosby based on D.A. Castor’s statement to the press that Cosby would not face charges,
which paved the way for Mr. Cosby to testify in a civil trial, meant that he should not have
been charged in the case. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that Cosby’s due process
rights were violated when a prosecutor ultimately chose to prosecute him after a former
prosecutor made an unconditional promise of nonprosecution, which Cosby relied upon to
his detriment by waiving his constitutional right not to testify and providing incriminating
deposition in a civil action. The principle of fundamental fairness that undergirds due process law demands that the former prosecutor’s promise not to prosecute Cosby be enforced,
therefore barring Cosby’s subsequent prosecution. See generally id.
179. Id. at 1099.
180. Id. at 1103.
181. Id.
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statements to investigators which in his opinion impaired her credibility.182 Fourth, the prosecutor believed that Constand’s behavior
after the alleged sexual assault, namely, continuing to communicate with Cosby, complicated the possibility of securing a conviction.183 Based on the totality of the circumstances, the prosecutor
decided not to bring sexual assault charges against Cosby.184
The explanations underlying the prosecutor’s declination statement, however, are deeply troubling. The problem with the prosecutor’s reasons for declination rests with misguided evaluation of
the evidence in the case, which was largely based on extra-legal
factors that were not mandated by the applicable state law, including Pennsylvania’s rules of evidence. Pennsylvania law does not
require that complainants promptly file a police report immediately after an alleged sexual assault.185 The prompt complaint requirement is a relic of the past and has been abolished and no
longer serves as a legal barrier to prosecution.186 Furthermore, the
prosecutor’s personal belief that a sexual assault victim would necessarily not continue to communicate with her attacker is similarly
based on mere unsupported assumptions and misconceptions
about how a sexual assault victim “is supposed” to behave. Moreover, mere inconsistencies in the various statements made by a complainant to police investigators does not necessarily diminish her
credibility as such inconsistencies are common in these circumstances.187 Finally, the prosecutor’s reasoning that Constand’s delay in filing a prompt complaint hindered investigators’ ability to
collect forensic evidence is likewise not based on any legal

182. Id.
183. Id. at 1104.
184. Id.
185. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3105 (2021) provides that “[p]rompt reporting to public authority is not required in a prosecution under this chapter: [p]rovided, however, [t]hat nothing in this section shall be construed to prohibit a defendant from introducing evidence of
the complainant’s failure to promptly report the crime if such evidence would be admissible
pursuant to the rules of evidence.”
186. See David P. Bryden & Erica Madore, Patriarchy, Sexual Freedom, and Gender
Equality as Causes of Rape, 13 OHIO STATE J. CRIM. L. 299, 345 (2016) (observing that “the
rule requiring a prompt complaint by the alleged rape victim did not exist until it was included in the Model Penal Code; thereafter it was adopted in only six states, all of which
later repealed it”).
187. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., INVESTIGATION OF THE NEW ORLEANS POLICE DEPARTMENT
46 (2011) (observing that New Orleans Police Department’s work on rape cases often emphasized the victim’s inconsistent statements, gaps in knowledge or memory, or inability to
give a good description of the perpetrator, none of which demonstrate that an allegation is
false; such reactions, common for sexual assault victims in crisis or suffering from posttraumatic stress, should not be used to label a report of assault as false).
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requirement because often there is no forensic evidence to support
a sexual assault complaint.188
3. Perpetuating Biases, Prejudices, and Marginalization
One of the most troubling illustrations of the extent to which
nonlegal factors affect prosecutors’ charging decisions concerns the
role that biases and prejudices play in assessing evidence in sexual
assault cases. Measuring the likelihood of conviction through the
lens of hypothetical juries is especially disconcerting because by
doing that, prosecutors incorporate into their charging decisions
juries’ biases and prejudices that underlie their perceptions of sexual assault complainants.189 By applying the convictability standard to deciding whether to bring sexual assault charges to trial,
prosecutors reinforce existing problematic community prejudices
about which sexual assault victims are deemed credible and thus
worthy of the law’s protection.190
Moreover, deference to the perspective of a hypothetical jury increases the chances that prosecutors’ decisions whether to file
charges would take into consideration juries’ reliance on extra-legal considerations that are shaped by questionable cultural norms
that are unfairly prejudicial to female complainants.191 Opening
the door to considerations which embed jurors’ misconceived beliefs about complainants’ behaviors results in charging decisions
that are framed by jurors’ personal worldviews, rather than by the
law.192 The infiltration of such factors into prosecutorial discretion
taints prosecutors’ objective assessment of complainants’ credibility.193 But what’s more unsettling is that it contributes to sexual

188. See Gwen Jenkins & Regina A. Schuller, The Impact of Negative Forensic Evidence
on Mock Jurors’ Perceptions of a Trial of Drug-Facilitated Sexual Assault, 31 LAW & HUM.
BEHAV. 369, 369–70 (2007) (observing that the absence of forensic evidence had a negative
impact on date rape cases even though certain date rape drugs cannot be detected more
than twelve hours after the ingestion).
189. See Dempsey, supra note 16, at 244–48.
190. See Frohmann, supra note 109, at 533.
191. See PAULA DIPERNA, JURIES ON TRIAL: FACES OF AMERICAN JUSTICE 218 (1984) (expressing concerns about the potential for jury verdicts to be “unpredictable and arbitrary,
susceptible to being moved by factors which do not have to do with the evidence”).
192. See Ruthy Lowenstein Lazar, Epistemic Twilight Zone of Consent, 30 S. CAL.
INTERDISC. L.J. 461, 490–92 (2021) (observing the gap between prosecutors’ assessment of
the complainant’s credibility and what the prosecutor believes will be the jurors’ beliefs and
view of the case).
193. Id. at 496–98.
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assault complainants’ marginalization, perpetuating the mistreatment of already marginalized victims.194
Sexual assault complainants often suffer multiple layers of biases, prejudices, and marginalization given the intersection of various factors. To begin with, sexual assault generally wreaks personal, psychological, emotional, and dignitary harm on all victims,
regardless of their gender.195 Additionally, sexual assault inflicts
various group-based harms, reaching beyond the harms experienced by specific victims.196 Since the majority of sexual assault
victims are women, one type of group harm is gendered. Women
are placed at a unique disadvantage because they have long been
deprived of the law’s protection against gendered-based harms.197
But the group harms that all female sexual assault ordinarily
suffer from qua women are further exacerbated whenever they are
also part of social groups that endure additional forms of harm and
marginalization due to their race, ethnicity, class and sexual orientation.198 Prosecutors’ decisions about whether to pursue sexual
assault charges often hinge on demographic and socioeconomic factors, with the sexual victimization of women from marginalized
communities, including low-income women and women of color,
frequently being discredited and dismissed.199
The racial implications underlying the underprosecution of sexual assault are particularly salient given the undervaluation of
sexual assaults of BIPOC victims and particularly Black women.200

194. See Tuerkheimer, supra note 12, at 49–50.
195. See Kimberly Kessler Ferzan & Peter Westen, How to Think (Like a Lawyer) About
Rape, 11 CRIM. L. & PHIL. 759, 788–91 (2017).
196. Cf. Michelle Madden Dempsey, Sex Trafficking and Criminalization: In Defense of
Feminist Abolitionism, 158 UNIV. PA. L. REV. 1729, 1746 (2010) (conceding that even if specific prostituted people do not feel harm personally, prostitution is mostly harmful to women
as a group).
197. See generally Donald A. Dripps, Why Rape Should Be a Federal Crime, 60 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 1685 (2019).
198. See TUERKHEIMER, CREDIBLE, supra note 122, at 6 (“[M]arginalized survivors suffer
most from our widespread tendencies to discount the credibility of accusers. Women of color,
poor women, women with disabilities, LGBTQ individuals, immigrant women—these are
the accusers least likely to be believed, whether by formal officials or by their family and
friends.”); see also id. at 192–95 (citing psychological research suggesting that women “are
treated particularly poorly by the system because of their intersectional identities”).
199. See Rose Corrigan & Corey S. Shdaimah, People with Secrets: Contesting, Constructing, and Resisting Women’s Claims About Sexualized Victimization, 65 CATH. U. L. REV.
429, 445–56 (2016).
200. See Harris, supra note 31, at 598; see also Jeffery J. Pokorak, Rape as a Badge of
Slavery: The Legal History of, and Remedies for, Prosecutorial Race-of-Victims Charging
Disparities, 7 NEV. L.J. 1, 38–43 (2006).
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Commentators have long noted that sexual assaults against Black
women are under-reported, underinvestigated, and underprosecuted when compared to cases where white victims were sexually
assaulted.201 Undervaluing the sexual victimization of minority
victims exemplifies racial-biased discrimination by police and prosecutors, exacerbating disparities among different groups of victims.202
Discrediting victims’ accounts of their sexual assault is one of
the multiple harms that is inflicted on sexual assault victims, as
being disbelieved is considered in itself an epistemic harm.203 Commentators distinguish between credibility and truth-telling,
stressing that enjoying credibility is not necessarily a function of
truth-telling because credibility attaches to those who comport
themselves as though they are truthful.204 Having their accounts
believed is thus pertinent for sexual assault victims because the
power of victims’ narratives lends credibility to their victimization
especially after they have been historically discredited by the
law.205
The phenomenon of “credibility discounting” is helpful in explaining the reasons underlying the underprosecution of sexual assault.206 Professor Deborah Tuerkheimer argues that prosecutors’
use of the convictability standard in deciding which sexual assault
cases to pursue demonstrates one example of epistemic injustice.207
The latter concept was coined by philosopher Miranda Fricker to
describe situations in which people use heuristics in making judgments about credibility, which in turn reinforce not only social and
cultural norms, but also biases about certain groups of people.208
Prejudice involves stereotypes that people use as heuristics in their
credibility of judgments, following generalizations about particular
social groups.209 Whenever an expected jury’s skepticism is the

201. See Pokorak, supra note 200, at 7, 42–43.
202. Id. at 6.
203. See Tuerkheimer, supra note 12, at 41–46; see also Anibal Rosario-Lebron, Evidence’s #MeToo Moment, 74 MIA. L. REV. 1, 32–49 (2019) (explaining how credibility discounting is reinforced in evidentiary impeachment rules that allow attacks on sexual assault victims’ character for truthfulness).
204. See Simon-Kerr, supra note 123, at 586.
205. See Tuerkheimer, supra note 12, at 36–38.
206. See id. at 37–41.
207. See id.
208. Id. at 41–42.
209. Id. at 42–43.
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effect of prejudice, prosecutors’ deference to a likely trial outcome
perpetuates such credibility discounting.
The prosecutorial practice of relying on a system of outcome bias
regarding assessments of convictability has distinctly harmful effects on marginalized sexual assault victims.210 While the notion of
credibility appears at first sight to be gender and race neutral, gendered and racialized norms pervasively shape its content because
factfinders’ decisions regarding whether an individual receives
credibility excess or deficit often turns on the race of this individual.211
The problem of credibility discounting is especially troubling
when the victims of sexual assault are BIPOC, especially Black
women.212 Group identity factors frequently affect the use of familiar stereotypes of historically powerless groups, such as women
and Black people.213 These groups disproportionately suffer from
prejudices stemming from the misperception that they lack credibility.214 Commentators have long noted that Black women in sexual assault cases are confronted with unique credibility obstacles,
as studies confirm that jurors were less likely to believe Black female complainants.215 When prosecutors engage in such “down
streaming” by considering at the charging stage prejudices and biases that hypothetical juries will likely employ, instead of independently assessing whether a complainant’s account is credible,
this practice carries especially adverse effects on marginalized victims.216 The excessive effect of credibility discounting on minority
victims reinforces their marginalization, exacerbating the harms
of sexual victimization. Moreover, existing problems of systemic
racism and patriarchal structures not only perpetuate social biases
and subordination of women but also exacerbate societal inequalities.217
Considering the underprosecution of sexual assault through the
perspective of intersectionality theory—also known as critical race

210. See Pokorak, supra note 200, at 42.
211. See MIRANDA FRICKER, EPISTEMIC INJUSTICE: POWER AND THE ETHICS OF KNOWING
23–29 (2007).
212. See Simon-Kerr, supra note 123, at 589–90.
213. See Tuerkheimer, supra note 12, at 43.
214. See Simon-Kerr supra note 123, at 589–90.
215. See Darren Lenard Hutchinson, Ignoring the Sexualization of Race: Heteronormativity, Critical Race Theory and Anti-Racist Politics, 47 BUFF. L. REV. 1, 85 (1999).
216. See Pokorak, supra note 200, at 42.
217. See Simon-Kerr, supra note 123, at 594.
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feminism—highlights additional ways in which race and gender
are inextricably intertwined with the law.218
In recent years, commentators began to identify the multiple
layers underlying the intersection between critical race theory and
evidence law.219 Critical race scholars expose the various racialized
and other group-based biases that underscore jurors’ evaluation of
witnesses, stressing that evidence law might perpetuate racial
subordination.220 Professor Jasmine Gonzales Rose argues that jurors often rely on nonlegal evidence that is not recognized by the
rules of evidence, using their own perceptions about the race of a
defendant, victim, or other witness to conclude that they are truthful or untruthful.221 Similarly, Professor Bennett Capers demonstrates the various ways in which jurors take into consideration
informal “evidence,” such as victims’ clothes, although it is unchecked and unregulated by formal evidence rules’ legal constraints.222 Capers further argues that jurors, including in sexual
assault cases, often use prejudicial evidence that rests on gendered, racial, and other biased factors that disfavor racial minorities and favor white people.223
Racial minorities, however, are not the only group of victims that
are disproportionately affected by prosecutors’ refusal to pursue
sexual assault charges. The underprosecution of sexual assault is
also prevalent where complainants are viewed by decision-makers
as “imperfect victim[s].”224 As noted earlier, studies confirm that
prosecutors often take into account factors such as complainants’
criminal records, engagement in risky behaviors like prostitution,
and drugs and alcohol consumption, when refusing to pursue sexual assault charges.225
Most jurisdictions criminalize the acts of both buyers and sellers
of commercial sex, resulting in sex workers’ dual status as both

218. See Dorothy E. Roberts, Critical Race Feminism, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON
FEMINIST JURISPRUDENCE 112 (Robin West & Cynthia Grant Bowman eds., 2019).
219. See, e.g., Bennett Capers, Evidence Without Rules, 94 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 867, 868
(2018); Jasmine B. Gonzales Rose, Toward a Critical Race Theory of Evidence, 101 MINN. L.
REV. 2243, 2244 (2017).
220. Gonzales Rose, supra note 219, at 2244.
221. Id. at 2262.
222. See Capers, supra note 219, at 874–95.
223. Id. at 869, 875–76, 891, 896.
224. See Tamara Rice Lave, The Prosecutor’s Duty to “Imperfect” Rape Victims, 49 TEX.
TECH. L. REV. 219, 222–23 (2016).
225. See supra section I.C.2.
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perpetrators and victims of crime.226 When sex workers are raped,
however, the law mostly fails to prosecute the crime, refusing to
recognize their victimization.227 To address this problem, some
commentators suggest that prosecutors might not have merely the
discretion, but an actual duty to pursue cases involving certain
kinds of crimes or certain groups of underserved victims, including
sexual assault perpetrated against people who engage in prostitution.228
Another category of underprosecuted sexual assault concerns
complainants who engaged in excessive consumption of alcohol or
drugs before or at the time of the incident. Sexual assaults of voluntarily intoxicated victims exemplify how jurors’ prejudices and
biases underscore the question of whether they believe complainants’ accounts.229 A prevalent societal misperception is that people
who voluntarily become intoxicated are more promiscuous because
by excessively drinking, they arguably make themselves sexually
available.230 Societal beliefs about intoxicated complainants affect
police officers’, prosecutors’, jurors’, and judges’ perceptions of sexual assault cases involving intoxicated victims. Jurors view these
victims with deep skepticism and are less prone to accept their
claims that they did not consent to sex.231
Prosecutors’ reluctance to pursue sexual assault charges when
complainants are perceived as immoral rather than innocent are
motivated by concerns that complainants’ accounts are likely to be
discredited by jurors who are unlikely to believe those who engage
in risky behaviors.232 By doing that, prosecutors reinforce gendered

226. See I. India Thusi, Radical Feminist Harms on Sex Workers, 22 LEWIS & CLARK L.
REV. 185, 193–94, 196–97 (2018). In this Article, I use the terms “sex workers” and people
engaged in “prostitution” interchangeably, without expressing a position on whether the
law should decriminalize the crime of prostitution.
227. See I. India Thusi, Sex, Harm, and Consequences, 2019 UTAH L. REV. 159, 166–67
(2019) (using the intersectionality perspective to critique the continued criminalization of
sex work of people of color).
228. See Rice Lave, supra note 224, at 227–29 (discussing the duty to prosecute sexual
assault of people engaged in sex work); cf. Rebecca Roiphe, The Duty to Charge in Police Use
of Excessive Force Cases, 65 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 503 (2017) (discussing the duty of charge in
police use for excessive force cases).
229. See Michal Buchhandler-Raphael, The Conundrum of Voluntary Intoxication and
Sex, 82 BROOK. L. REV. 1031, 1033–34 (2017).
230. See id. at 1042–43, 1045.
231. Id. at 1045.
232. See Lisa Frohmann, Discrediting Victims’ Allegations of Sexual Assault: Prosecutorial Accounts of Case Rejection, 38 SOC. PROBS. 213, 224 (1991); see also Rice Lave, supra
note 224, at 223.
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and race-based marginalization of sexual assault victims, perpetuating systemic biases and societal prejudices against them.
Additionally, sexual assault complainants have long suffered
from the legal system “blaming” them for engaging in behaviors
that “contribute” to their assault.233 The upshot of prosecutors taking into account factors such as “immoral” behavior is that jurors
and judges continue the infamous practice of victim blaming.234
Therefore, another unintended consequence of the convictability
standard is that it results in perpetuating problematic victimblaming norms.
4. Overemphasizing the Goal of “Winning”
Another drawback in prosecutors’ reliance on the convictability
standard concerns unjustifiably overemphasizing the goal of “winning” cases. In choosing to file charges only if they believe the case
is “winnable,” prosecutors engage in instrumental decision-making
that is largely conviction oriented rather than embracing a more
holistic view of the case, which contemplates other important considerations besides winning.235
Studies demonstrate that the desire to win their cases is among
the factors that motivate prosecutors’ decision-making processes.236 Prosecutors’ offices typically maintain a “winning” mentality, carrying mindsets of nondefeat and aversions to dismissal
of the charges.237 Studies further show that when sexual assaults
are prosecuted, conviction rates are high, which is attributed to aggressive screening out of cases and taking on only those that would
likely result in conviction.238 Operating under this institutional
pressure to accomplish high conviction rates, prosecutors are consciously or unconsciously incentivized to refuse to bring sexual assault charges in close cases.239

233. See, e.g., JODY RAPHAEL, RAPE IS RAPE: HOW DENIAL, DISTORTION, AND VICTIM
BLAMING ARE FUELING A HIDDEN ACQUAINTANCE RAPE CRISIS 50–51 (2013) (“[S]ome progressives continue to believe that individuals who pursue sexually liberated lifestyles must
accept the risk of rape, an attitude that understandably affects judges and juries as well.”).
234. See Anne M. Coughlin, Interrogation Stories, 95 VA. L. REV. 1599, 1605–07 (2009).
235. See Dempsey, supra note 16, at 260, 263.
236. See Eisenberg, supra note 153, at 887.
237. See Josh Bowers, Punishing the Innocent, 156 UNIV. PA. L. REV. 1117, 1128 (2008).
238. See Dripps, supra note 197, at 1709.
239. See MORABITO ET AL., supra note 14, at 83. See generally Ferzan, supra note 165, at
33 (noting that prosecutors “will not prosecute cases if they think they cannot win”).
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Likewise, prosecutors that are inculcated in an office culture
that prioritizes winning as an independent goal, gravitate towards
avoidance in pursuing cases that they perceive as “hard to win,”
preferring to take on the relatively easy cases, where conviction is
more likely.240
Sexual assault prosecutions are indeed hard cases to get a conviction, especially where the parties are acquaintances.241 When
the evidence consists mostly of the complainant and the defendant’s diametrically opposing accounts about the presence or absence of consent, persuading the jury of the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt is a challenging task. And rightly so.
Justice demands that prosecutors’ burden of proof will not be anything less than beyond a reasonable doubt.
Yet, prosecutors’ emphasis on winning cases is not mandated by
law, as no court decision holds that winning is an independent
goal.242 Additionally, neither prosecutors’ professional nor ethical
codes of conduct provide that prosecutors should assess the sufficiency of the evidence using an outcome-driven approach that
grounds charging decisions on the likelihood of securing a conviction.243 Prosecutors’ prediction of the likelihood of winning the case
is therefore a self-imposed limit, rather than any substantive, procedural or evidentiary impediment.
A plausible counterargument is that efficiency and budget constraints demand prudent allocation of scarce public resources and
justify the refusal to spend resources on cases that are not likely to
result in conviction.244 While this is a valid consideration, it should
not be dispositive in determining whether to pursue sexual assault
charges. Efficiency and efficacy considerations ought to be equitably balanced against competing interests that support bringing
charges. I will delve into these important interests in Part III while
proposing an equitable prosecution model to remedy the underprosecution of sexual assault problem.245 For now, suffice it to say

240. See Dripps, supra note 197, at 1709–10.
241. See Bryden & Lengnick, supra note 72, at 1246.
242. Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935) (emphasizing that the prosecutor’s
interest in a criminal prosecution “is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be
done”).
243. See generally NATIONAL PROSECUTION STANDARDS, NAT’L DIST. ATT’YS ASS’N, http
s://ndaa.org/wp-content/uploads/NDAA-NPS-3rd-Ed.-w-Revised-Commentary.pdf [https://p
erma.cc/EZJ4-X9SE].
244. See MORABITO ET AL., supra note 14, at 83.
245. See infra section III.C.
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that tactical considerations, standing alone, such as anticipated
difficulties in winning the case, are not sufficiently good reasons
for declining to bring sexual assault charges. Criminal prosecution
is not a competition, and neither legal nor normative reasons suggest that securing a conviction ought to be the exclusive factor
guiding prosecutors’ charging decisions.
C. The Reasonable Prosecutor’s Sufficiency of the Evidence
Standard
Rejecting convictability as the controlling standard in deciding
whether to pursue sexual assault charges calls for applying in sexual assault cases the same evidentiary that prosecutors rely on in
assessing evidence in all other cases, namely, the sufficiency of the
evidence standard.
Importantly, the general legal standard for determining
whether evidence supports conviction of the defendant beyond a
reasonable doubt is sufficiency, rather than the convictability
standard.246 Prosecutors’ insistence on the more onerous convictability standard in the context of sexual assault is not legally mandated. In all types of crimes, the applicable legal standard requires
the prosecutor to consider whether the rational trier of fact could
find the evidence sufficient to prove guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt. There is no principled reason why the sufficiency standard
should not similarly apply in sexual assault prosecutions.
Yet, as noted earlier, courts and commentators do not agree on
how to assess evidentiary sufficiency.247 To guide prosecutors’ decision-making process in evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence,
I propose a standard that draws on the reasonableness of prosecutors’ charging decisions, as measured through an objective perspective of professional prosecutors. An evidentiary standard that focuses on assessing whether jurors could and should convict, as a
matter of law, is especially suitable to address the distinct problem
of underprosecution of sexual assault. Reasonable prosecutors
should consider only whether there is sufficient evidence to support conviction beyond a reasonable doubt. Furthermore, making
these sufficiency of evidence determinations should be based only

246. In re Winship, 398 U.S. 358 (1970); Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 313 (1979)
(evidence in support of conviction is sufficient if it leads a rational trier of fact to find guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt).
247. See supra section II.A.
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on the legal merits of the case. This merits-based requirement
stems from prosecutors’ duty to act independently and impartially
and ground their charging decisions in a consistent, principled, and
transparent process.248
Professor Michelle Madden Dempsey has long suggested that
prosecutors adopt a merits-based approach to evaluating evidentiary sufficiency in deciding whether to bring sexual assault
charges.249 Her proposal, however, has not been sufficiently developed and the concept of a merits-based approach as underlying evidentiary sufficiency in sexual assault cases remains undertheorized. Building on this promising concept, the standard I propose
below also focuses on evaluating the legal merits of cases but adds
another layer, that is considering the case through the lens of a
reasonable prosecutor that assesses whether there is a reasonable
possibility that jurors could convict.
A standard that assesses evidentiary sufficiency through the
lens of the reasonable prosecutor emphasizes the importance of an
objective assessment of cases by shifting prosecutors’ attention
from predicting the likely outcome of cases brought before hypothetical juries to objectively assessing the cases’ actual strength
through their own professional analysis of the evidence. The prediction that juries will be unreceptive to a sexual assault victim’s
account is not a merits-based reason for declining to prosecute if
the prosecutor believes that sufficient evidence exists in the case
to allow a reasonable jury to convict.
Evaluating evidentiary sufficiency from a reasonable prosecutor’s perspective is superior to the convictability standard because
it embodies a prescriptive approach to prosecutors’ charging decisions rather than simply adhering to descriptive norms.250 The convictability standard is grounded in a descriptive evaluation of what
jurors would likely do in a given sexual assault case; namely,
whether they would convict the defendant. In contrast, a standard
that centers on the reasonable prosecutor’s assessment of the sufficiency of the evidence in the case encompasses a prescriptive assessment of whether the jury should, as a matter of the law and
given the admissible evidence, find the defendant guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt.251 Under this standard, a reasonable prosecutor
248.
249.
250.
251.

See Green & Zacharias, supra note 60, at 870–71.
See Dempsey, supra note 16, at 251–52.
Bellin, supra note 38, at 1223.
Id. at 1222–23 (articulating an evidentiary charging standard whereby prosecutors
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would objectively evaluate what the charging decision should be,
regardless of whether they believe a hypothetical jury is likely to
convict.252 The difference between what a jury might do and what
it reasonably could and should do captures a stark normative contrast. The reasonable prosecutor standard is normatively justified,
placing legal considerations at the center of charging decisions.
The reasonable prosecutor’s sufficiency of the evidence standard
is less demanding than the onerous convictability standard in
terms of measuring probabilities. The key difference between these
standards is best captured by the distinction between the notions
of substantial probability, namely high likelihood of conviction,
which is what the convictablity standard demands, and reasonable
possibility of conviction, which is what the reasonable prosecutor’s
sufficiency of the evidence standard requires.253
Importantly, the reasonable possibility standard does not diminish the reasonable prosecutor’s obligation to try the case only if in
their professional assessment, there is sufficient evidence to allow
the jury to convict the defendant beyond a reasonable doubt. But
when the reasonable prosecutor believes that the evidence is sufficient to support defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, and
that there is a reasonable possibility that the jury will convict, they
should take the case to trial.
The legally sufficient evidence that a reasonable prosecutor
should assess encompass a host of factors that a professional prosecutor is capable of evaluating. These consist, among others, assessing the credibility of the complainant as compared with the
credibility of the suspect, as well as any other pieces of evidence,
including nonforensic evidence, such as verbal statements the complainant made immediately after the alleged assault.
Sexual assault victims may tell different people after the incident that they have been assaulted. These statements are likely to
meet the requirements of several hearsay exceptions that typically
allow admission of statements that are made at the crime scene.254
Such compelling statements may strengthen complainants’ credibility while testifying in trial. For example, excited utterances are
bring charges when they expect that the evidence introduced at trial will prove the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt).
252. See Dempsey, supra note 16, at 259.
253. See generally Jonathan S. Masur, Probability Thresholds, 92 IOWA L. REV. 1293
(2007) (discussing the various probability standards).
254. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 803(2) and states evidence rules adopting the same rule.
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exceptions to hearsay and include excited responses to a traumatic
event made while the victims were still under the stress that the
assault caused.255 Excited utterances would include crime victims’
statements to 911 operators or to the police officer interviewing
them immediately after they report the alleged crime and will
likely fall under the excited utterance hearsay exception.256
Likewise, statements that victims make to family members,
friends and acquaintances after the alleged assault are likely to
qualify as excited utterances.257 These verbal and nonverbal responses to the assault are assertive statements that were made
while the victim was still under the emotional impact of the assault. These also include statements made to volunteers at sexual
assault support centers and may either be communicated in person
or via electronic communication like chats and text messages.258
The excited utterance exception to hearsay is routinely used in violent assault cases to admit statements by the victim after the attack.259 These statements implicate the accused, as they are considered genuine and reliable and have high probative value given
their temporal proximity to the traumatic event.260
Moreover, a reasonable prosecutor might also introduce into evidence testimonies from doctors and nurses as well as mental
health professionals like psychologists and social workers about a
complainant’s statements relayed to them at the time of treatment
after the assault.261 These statements to health care personnel, including those made while conducting a rape kit examination, such
as statements made to sexual assault nurse examiners (“SANE”)
and sexual assault forensic examiners (“SAFE”), are likely to be

255. See Colin Miller, A Shock to the System: Analyzing the Conflict Among Courts Over
Whether and When Excited Utterances May Follow Subsequent Startling Occurrences
in Rape and Sexual Assault Cases, 12 WM. & MARY J. WOMAN & L. 49, 58–59 (2005).
256. Gary M. Bishop, Testimonial Statements, Excited Utterances and the Confrontation
Clause: Formulating a Precise Rule After Crawford and Davis, 54 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 559, 586
(2006); see also Miller, supra note 255, at 98–99.
257. See CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER, LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK & LIESA L. RICHTER,
EVIDENCE 880–87 (6th ed. 2018).
258. National Sexual Assault Hotline Confidential 24/7 Support, RAINN, https://www.
rainn.org/resources [https://perma.cc/Q6JG-AS2C].
259. See MUELLER ET AL., supra note 257, at 880–81 (noting that in cases of violent criminal assault, statements by the victim implicating the accused are routinely admitted, as
are statements by nonvictim eyewitnesses).
260. Id. at 882–85.
261. See id. at 909–13, 915–16.
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admissible under the medical treatment or diagnosis hearsay exception as these are typically pertinent to the treatment.262
Admitting into evidence complainants’ statements to various
people made after the sexual assault can significantly bolster their
credibility while testifying at trial. Acknowledging the role that
such statements may play also belies the inaccurate assumption
that the evidence in acquaintance rape cases consists only of the
parties’ conflicting accounts.263 Prosecutors’ reliance on the convictability standard discounts the powerful role that complainants’
out-of-court statements may play at trial. Conversely, the sufficiency of the evidence standard, as measured through the lens of a
reasonable prosecutor, emphasizes the ways in which complainants’ statements strengthen the credibility of their trial testimonies, reinforcing their accounts of the alleged assault.
Likewise, the reasonable prosecutor’s sufficiency of the evidence
standard diminishes the weight of extra-legal factors that shape
prosecutors’ decisions under the convictability standard. As the
previous section demonstrates, potential jurors’ biases and prejudices improperly infiltrate prosecutors’ decisions.264 The reasonable prosecutor’s emphasis solely on the admissible evidence in the
case is likely to ensure that external and inherently subjective factors, including jurors’ prejudices and biases, are disregarded.
Another strength of the proposed standard is that it incorporates
the notion of objective reasonableness into prosecutors’ charging
decisions. To date, the term “reasonable prosecutor” has largely
been used to assess the reasonableness, or lack thereof, of prosecutors’ decisions to file charges without probable cause. 265 While the
reasonableness requirement aims to prohibit overzealous prosecutors from overcharging, commentators have yet to use the term to
judge the appropriateness of the parallel problem of undercharging.
Applying the commonly used legal notion of reasonableness to
assess prosecutors’ decisions not to file charges is especially pertinent in the sexual assault context. In this area, prosecutors often

262. See, e.g., State v. Miller, 264 P.3d 461, 490 (Kan. 2011); State v. Dorsey, No. 11 CA
39, 2012 Ohio App. LEXIS 554, at *8–10 (Feb. 17, 2012); State v. Stahl, 855 N.E.2d 834,
839–40, 846 (Ohio 2006).
263. See Tuerkheimer, supra note 12, at 10.
264. See supra section II.B.3.
265. See Daniel S. Medwed, Emotionally Charged: The Prosecutorial Charging Decision
and the Innocence Revolution, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 2187, 2199 (2010).
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make inherently subjective judgments about these contested cases
because of the complexity of the notion of consent to sex.266 Using
the reasonable prosecutor perspective is appropriate because the
sufficiency of the evidence should be measured against objective
factors underlying prosecutors’ professional opinion regarding
cases’ strength.
An additional advantage of adopting the reasonable prosecutor’s
sufficiency of the evidence standard is that it addresses not only
the concern that a hypothetical jury would take into account nonlegal considerations but also the possibility that prosecutors might
do that as well. Individual prosecutors’ perceptions of a sexual assault case may themselves be biased and prejudiced against marginalized victims. A prosecutor’s belief about the suspect’s guilt is
inherently subjective and might unduly incorporate the prosecutor’s idiosyncrasies and personal worldviews. Incorporating a reasonable component into prosecutors’ charging decisions ameliorates the risks of prosecutors’ own reliance on heuristics.267
Having outlined the benefits of an alternative evidentiary standard to replace the convictability standard, I now hypothesize its
application by revisiting the case against Jacob Anderson, discussed earlier, where the prosecutor decided not to pursue sexual
assault charges due to convictability concerns.268 This is a test case
to illustrate that the reasonable prosecutor standard would have
likely changed the outcome, resulting in trying the sexual assault
charges in court.
A reasonable prosecutor would have considered whether the evidence in the Anderson case was sufficient to prove the defendant’s
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, based solely on the case’s legal
merits. Excerpts from the prosecutor’s letter to the victim, discussed earlier, suggest that the prosecutor initially believed that
there was sufficient evidence to pursue the sexual assault charge
and that the victim’s account was credible.269 Under existing laws,
neither corroboration nor DNA or other forensic evidence are legally necessary for a sexual assault conviction. A reasonable prosecutor, however, would have taken into account additional

266. See Kimberly Kessler Ferzan, Consent, Culpability, and the Law of Rape, 13 OHIO
ST. J. CRIM. L. 397, 402–07 (2016).
267. See Alafair S. Burke, Improving Prosecutorial Decision Making: Some Lessons of
Cognitive Science, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1587, 1591–92 (2006).
268. See supra notes 2–3 and accompanying text.
269. See Yan, supra note 9.
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testimonies that would bolster the complainant’s credibility. These
would have included testimonies of persons with whom she communicated immediately after the sexual assault; for example, people who attended the party where the assault occurred. Likewise,
these would also include testimonies from nurses who treated the
victim after the assault as well as from therapists who provided
the victim with psychological treatment pursuant to the alleged
crime.
A reasonable prosecutor, however, would not make their decision whether to pursue the sexual assault charges based on the
likelihood that a hypothetical jury would convict. A reasonable
prosecutor would also not have taken into account nonlegal considerations, such as the facts that the suspect sexually assaulted only
one victim, and that both the suspect and the victim were intoxicated at the time of the incident. Instead, a reasonable prosecutor
would have likely taken the case to trial, because based on the
prosecutor’s professional assessment that a jury could and should,
based on the sufficient admissible evidence in the case, convict the
defendant beyond a reasonable doubt.
Some readers might object to substituting the reasonable prosecutor’s sufficiency of the evidence standard for the convictability
standard by arguing that prosecutors’ reliance on predicting the
likelihood of conviction is warranted. Critics might raise a concern
that bringing charges in cases that would not result in conviction
might prove counterintuitive; weakening rather than strengthening societal norms surrounding sexual assault.270 Others would
likely stress the benefits of the convictability standard, given budgetary, efficiency, and efficacy constraints limiting prosecutors’ offices.271 Still others would argue that deference to jurors’ perspectives is valuable, because it accurately reflects communities’
standards, therefore mirroring the democratic will of the people.272
Additionally, one commentator who conducted an empirical research on federal prosecutors’ charging decisions argues that jurors’ perspectives help prosecutors shape their own view of the

270. See Dan M. Kahan, Gentle Nudges vs. Hard Shoves: Solving the Sticky Norms Problem, 67 UNIV. CHI. L. REV. 607, 608 (2000) (coining the “sticky norms problem” to refer to
lawmakers trying to radically change norms surrounding acquaintance rape).
271. See supra section I.C.
272. See Daniel S. McConkie, Jr., Criminal Justice Citizenship, 72 FLA. L. REV. 1023,
1046–50 (2020).
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case, promoting fairness and collaborative internal discussions
within their offices’ organizational structure. 273
While these are plausible arguments, the premise underlying
the proposal to reject the convictability standard is that the many
drawbacks to this standard, as elaborated earlier,274 substantially
outweigh its benefits. Concededly, applying the reasonable prosecutor’s sufficiency of the evidence standard might result in prosecutors pursuing sexual assault charges even if they believe the jury
might acquit based on their disagreement with the law or their
personal worldviews.275 This is an inevitable feature of a standard
that prioritizes adherence to strict legal considerations rather than
deferring to communities’ choices and preferences, as embedded in
the hypothetical jury inquiry.276
Yet, the concern that rejecting the convictability standard will
lead to more acquittals and thus would weaken social norms
against sexual violence is merely theoretical. The assertion has
never been empirically tested, and it is unclear if it may be empirically proven.277 It is impossible to predict what the effect of bringing more sexual assault charges will be if an alternative standard
is adopted.278 This uncertainty leaves open the question of whether
filing more sexual assault charges would eventually strengthen or
weaken the criminal prohibition against sexual assault.
But even assuming arguendo that applying the proposed standard might result in more acquittals, cogent policy-based reasons
offset this potential outcome. There are normative benefits to pursuing sexual assault charges in appropriate cases despite low likelihood of conviction. As discussed above, one drawback to prosecutors’ reliance on the convictability standard is that deference to
jurors’ perceptions mirror local communities’ values, which might
perpetuate racialized, misogynistic or otherwise prejudiced and
273. See Offit, supra note 68, at 1107, 1112, 1114.
274. See supra sections B.1–4
275. Id.; Bellin supra note 38, at 1222 (observing that “the prosecutor could pursue a
case against an alleged date rapist even if the prosecutor believed the jury would acquit
based on their disagreement with the law”).
276. Id. (rejecting the prosecutor’s belief means that prosecutors should not defer to their
own understanding of what justice means or to the result the community prefers).
277. See Dempsey, supra note 16, at 258–59.
278. Id.; see also Paul H. Robinson, Criminalization Tensions: Empirical Desert, Changing Norms & Rape Reform, in THE STRUCTURE OF CRIMINAL LAW 201 (R.A. Duff et al. eds.,
Oxford Univ. Press, 2011) (positing that “every case litigated in public would become . . . an
opportunity to promote the public’s discussion of what should be considered ‘reasonable’ in
this context”).
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biased norms that should be repudiated.279 Prosecutorial deference
to such problematic norms thus hinders the possibility of fostering
a meaningful social change and promoting social justice goals.
In sum, the convictability standard proves an impediment to
solving the problem of underprosecution of sexual assault. The alternative reasonable prosecutor’s sufficiency of the evidence standard promises to promote more equitable prosecution of these
crimes. This proposed standard is warranted from a normative perspective in the context of sexual assault cases, which have traditionally been underprosecuted. The next part proposes a broader
conceptual framework that calls for invigorating the prosecution of
sexual assault to facilitate more just and fair treatment of all
stakeholders in the criminal process including marginalized victims.
III. AN EQUITABLE PROSECUTION MODEL
Advocating for the adoption of an alternative evidentiary standard to assess sexual assault cases’ strength is the first step necessary for reforming the treatment of these underprosecuted crimes.
A more vigorous prosecution of sexual assault, however, must also
rest on normative considerations underscoring why reform is warranted from a principled public policy perspective.
The discussion below introduces a novel prosecutorial theory
that is designed to provide a more robust prosecution of sexual assault and effectively promote social justice goals. The theory that I
develop here, which I refer to as the Equitable Prosecution Model
(“EPM”), suggests that prosecutors embrace a civil rights approach
to bringing sexual assault charges, because victims of these crimes
have traditionally and continuously experienced the law’s underprotection.
To date, the concept of equitable prosecution is not only undertheorized but also rarely mentioned in the literature.280 Developing
this concept, the EPM asserts that prosecutors owe a duty to the
public to exercise their discretion to file charges in manner that is
279. See supra section B.3.
280. Searching the term “equitable prosecution” yields only twenty-four hits on
WESTLAW (January 2022). The notion of equitable prosecution is one tenet of the nonprofit
organization, Fair and Just Prosecution (“FJP”), which aims to promote a criminal legal
system that is grounded in fairness, equity, compassion, and fiscal responsibility. For the
organization’s actions, see generally FAIR & JUST PROSECUTION, https://fairandjustprosecution.org/ [https://perma.cc/H4G7-RJHY].
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fair and just to all members of society, defendants and victims
alike. This model is the first scholarly account that uses the concept of equitable prosecution to justify a more vigorous prosecution
of crimes like sexual assault that have largely been underprosecuted. While the discussion below largely focuses on applying the
EPM in sexual assault cases, it also offers a broader conceptual
framework for revisiting other crimes that have been traditionally
underprosecuted, including excessive police violence, hate crimes
and crimes against sexual minorities.281
A. The Lack of Consensus on the Prosecutor’s Role
A key tenet of the EPM rests with identifying prosecutors’ roles
and obligations in the criminal legal system. To date, courts and
commentators have yet to agree on what prosecutors’ obligations
encompass, failing to provide useful guidelines that underpin prosecutors’ roles in a coherent conceptual framework.
The 1935 Supreme Court’s decision in Berger v. United States
announced a broad legal standard underlying prosecutorial function, holding that a prosecutor’s role is to represent “a sovereignty
whose obligation to govern impartially . . . and whose interest
therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case,
but that justice shall be done.”282 Despite the eighty-seven years
that have passed since Berger was handed down, the decision is
still widely cited for the proposition that prosecutors have an obligation is to seek justice. Yet, the Court has provided neither more
recent iterations nor specific guidance on this general obligation.283
While the Berger decision broadly stands for the proposition that
prosecutors must do justice, its language also includes two additional requirements. First, the decision mandates that prosecutors
act “impartially,” a requirement that commentators interpret to
encompass prosecutorial neutrality which requires prosecutors’

281. See sources cited supra note 49 and accompanying text for Articles that address the
underprosecution of other crimes. Further elaborating on the implications of extending the
model to additional underprosecuted crimes, however, exceeds the scope of this Article, and
I leave it for consideration in future scholarly works.
282. 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935).
283. See Bruce A. Green, Why Should Prosecutors “Seek Justice”?, 26 FORDHAM URB. L.J.
607, 612, 625–26, 634 (1999) (noting the rationales that explain why prosecutors have a
duty to seek justice: gross imbalance of power between the government and individual defendants, and the fact that the prosecutor is a representative of the state and states have
an obligation and responsibility to dispense justice in a fair and just manner).
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decisions to be principled and consistent.284 Second, the Court uses
the obligation language when referring to the prosecutor’s role.285
Framing the prosecutorial function in terms of an obligation
which is owed to the public has received little scholarly attention.286 But using the duty, rather than discretion language, to describe the prosecutor’s role is critically important because it emphasizes that states—and prosecutors as their representatives—
have an obligation to dispense justice in a fair and just manner.
Similarly, the prosecutor’s duty to make equitable decisions stands
at the core of the EPM. I will consider the implications of framing
the prosecutor’s role in a duty to the public, including to crime victims, in subsequent sections, while developing the civil rights approach underpinning the EPM.287
The judicial requirement that prosecutors “do justice” proved not
only conceptually amorphous and elusive but also meaningless in
practice.288 Concepts such as promoting the public interest or justice are inherently too diffuse and elastic to structure prosecutors’
discretion.289 The vague and ambiguous mandate does not offer
prosecutors any concrete guidelines on how to exercise their discretionary power in particular cases.290
In the absence of any practical judicial guidance, different prosecutors’ offices invoke various conflicting concepts of what “seeking
justice” means; for several decades, prosecutors prioritized “tough
justice,” that is the need to be “tough on crime” to promote the public’s safety.291 Others emphasized “popular justice,” aimed at best
serving their constituents.292 Still others advanced “social justice”
as a way to end mass incarceration.293 Yet, these policies are
284. Berger, 295 U.S. at 88; see Green & Zacharias, supra note 60, at 880–82.
285. Berger, 295 U.S. at 88.
286. For a notable exception, see Bruce A. Green & Rebecca Roiphe, A Fiduciary Theory
of Prosecution, 69 AM. UNIV. L. REV. 805, 806–08 (2020).
287. See infra sections III.B–C.
288. See, e.g., Fred C. Zacharias, Structuring the Ethics of Prosecutorial Trial Practice:
Can Prosecutors Do Justice?, 44 VAND. L. REV. 45, 46, 58 (1991); R. Michael Cassidy, Character and Context: What Virtue Theory Can Teach Us About a Prosecutor’s Ethical Duty to
“Seek Justice”, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 635, 637–38 (2006).
289. See Bibas, supra note 60, at 959–61.
290. See Bellin, supra note 38, at 1211.
291. See id.; see also Arit John, A Timeline of the Rise and Fall of ‘Tough on Crime’ Drug
Sentencing, THE ATLANTIC (Apr. 22, 2014), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive
/2014/04/a-timeline-of-the-rise-and-fall-of-tough-on-crime-drug-sentencing/360983/ [https://
perma.cc/HZL6-LWP9] (discussing the timeline of the “tough on crime” era).
292. See Bellin, supra note 38, at 1211.
293. See supra section III.C.2 (elaborating on the progressive prosecution phenomenon).
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sporadic and often inconsistent and none draws on a unified theory
of the prosecutorial role.
In recent years, scholars studying prosecutorial discretion have
tried to develop a unified, principled theory that underlies the prosecutor’s role in the criminal legal system.294 There is no scholarly
consensus on what is the institutional role that prosecutors play
when they exercise their public duties.295 Commentators disagree
on how prosecutors should make their discretionary charging decision, and specifically, how prosecutors should identify the relevant
considerations and balance competing public concerns underlying
these prosecutorial choices.296
For example, Professor Jeffrey Bellin advances a prosecutorial
theory that is grounded on a servant-of-the-law model.297 Under
this model, prosecutors would give preference to defendant-protective constitutional provisions over mechanical enforcement of criminal statutes, dismiss minor cases given resource constraints, and
default to less severe charges when having the option.298 Others
ground the prosecutor’s role in constitutional mandates, suggesting that prosecutors should enforce constitutional protections for
defendants when the adversarial system fails to do so.299
Existing theories of prosecution largely embrace a defendantoriented approach which emphasizes the need for placing constraints on prosecutorial excesses in exercising their discretion.
Doing so is perceived as a corrective measure to ameliorate problems of overenforcement that prosecutors significantly contributed
to during four decades of advancing “tough on crime” policies.300
Advancing prosecutorial policies aimed at restricting prosecutorial
discretion is not only justified but also necessary as in most areas
of criminal enforcement the legal system indeed suffers from overprosecution. The alternative prosecutorial theory that I develop in

294. See generally Green & Zacharias, supra note 60, at 840; Bellin, supra note 38; Green
& Roiphe, supra note 286.
295. See Bellin, supra note 38, at 1204–05.
296. See Green & Roiphe, supra note 286, at 807–09.
297. See Bellin, supra note 38, at 1212.
298. Id. at 1213–15.
299. See Eric S. Fish, Prosecutorial Constitutionalism, 90 S. CAL. L. REV. 237, 253–54,
305 (2017).
300. See Lissa Griffin & Ellen Yaroshefsky, Ministers of Justice and Mass Incarceration,
30 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 301, 302–05 (2017); K. Babe Howell, Prosecutorial Discretion and
the Duty to Seek Justice in an Overburdened Criminal Justice System, 27 GEO. J. LEGAL
ETHICS 285, 301 (2014).
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subsequent sections takes no issue with these theories as applied
in the context of overprosecuted crimes.
These theories, however, are not attentive to the distinctive considerations that underlie the treatment of underprosecuted crimes
like sexual assault. Exclusively emphasizing the need to promote
defendants’ rights obfuscates the fact that the interests of other
stakeholders in the criminal legal system, including victims, also
warrant protection.
Theories that ground the prosecutor’s role in fiduciary duties
that the prosecutor owes to the public take an important step in
that direction by incorporating additional considerations underlying prosecutors’ charging decisions. Professors Bruce Green and
Rebecca Roiphe suggest that the prosecutor’s obligation to seek justice should focus attention on duties of care and loyalty that prosecutors owe the public at large.301 A theory that draws on the notion of fiduciary duties to the public, they argue, incorporates
intrinsic considerations to justice, which entail a “constellation of
interests” and values, among them, avoiding wrongful convictions,
treating people proportionally and equally, using the criminal process to incapacitate dangerous individuals, deterring future offenses, and securing retribution and restitution for victims.302
Among others, they continue, prosecutors have an obligation of
care to victims since fiduciary duties to the public’s interests presuppose care for interested private parties.303
Grounding the prosecutor’s role in fiduciary duties to the public
adds a much-needed perspective that is largely missing from existing theories of prosecution; it recognizes that the prosecutor’s obligations regarding bringing criminal charges ought to be examined
not only through the lens of defendants’ rights but also through a
broader framework that accounts for additional considerations
that shape the justness and fairness of specific prosecutorial
choices.
The notion of prosecutors’ fiduciary duties underscores the role
that victims’ interests should play in the prosecutors’ charging decisions by suggesting that they ought to be factored into the calculus while weighing competing considerations.304 Yet, the fiduciary

301.
302.
303.
304.

See Green & Roiphe, supra note 286, at 809.
Id. at 809–10.
Id. at 834.
See id. at 808–09.
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theory of prosecution is a theory of general applicability that is not
specifically tailored to address the unique considerations underlying the prosecution of sexual assault and other crimes that are typically underprosecuted.
Scholars have yet to develop a normative theory of prosecution
that sufficiently accommodates competing considerations affecting
the public at large, including those impacting victims of underprosecuted crimes like sexual assault.
The EPM that this Article develops in subsequent sections does
precisely that. It crafts a prosecutorial theory that is attentive to
cases that are mostly characterized by a dearth of prosecutions,
like sexual assault. Under the EPM, prosecutors also ought to factor in other considerations, including victims’ interests, in addition
to defendants’ rights, and properly balance between them. The section below considers the role that victims’ interests ought to play
under such an alternative theory of prosecution.
B. Victims’ Interests
In general, interests are mostly framed in positive terms, implicating the government’s obligation to act in a particular way, including ensuring people’s interests in being safe from crime and in
avoiding additional harm.305 When conceived this way, sexual assault victims have an interest in the government bringing criminal
charges against those who harmed them. These interests, however,
are currently not sufficiently protected in our criminal legal system
which fails to adequately prosecute sexual assault.
Crime victims are not independent parties to criminal prosecutions where only the state and the defendant are parties to the proceeding.306 One feature that distinguishes criminal law from tort
law is that the former aims to vindicate public harms, whereas the
latter focuses on private injuries.307 Existing criminal process
305. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Constitutional Scholarship in the 1990s, 45 HASTINGS L.J.
1105, 1114–15 (1994) (reviewing PUBLIC VALUES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1993) (distinguishing between rights and interests, noting that while rights are negative, interests are
positive)).
306. See Richard Barajas & Scott Alexander Nelson, The Proposed Crime Victims’ Federal Constitutional Amendment: Working Toward a Proper Balance, 49 BAYLOR L. REV. 1,
10–11 (1997).
307. See JEFFRIE G. MURPHY & JULES L. COLEMAN, THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW:
INTRODUCTION TO JURISPRUDENCE 170 (1984) (“The standard way of drawing this distinction is to say that duties imposed by tort law cover private harms, and those imposed in
the criminal law cover public harms.”).
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therefore largely does not require prosecutors to accord any weight
to the preferences of crime victims.308
Many criminal law theorists, however, emphasize that the interests of crime victims are a central tenet of contemporary criminal
law.309 In recent years, commentators recognized that the criminal
legal system should take into consideration victims’ interests in the
criminal process, and that the notion of “public harm” intrinsically
encompasses the obligation to redress these interests.310 These accounts further point to empirical evidence showing that the effect
of victim rights laws is leveling the playing field by empowering
otherwise disempowered victims and equalizing outcomes.311 For
example, Stephanos Bibas, then law professor and now Circuit
Judge, supported strengthening formal avenues for participation
in the criminal process, especially for victims who have traditionally been underserved by the criminal legal system.312 Similarly, in
advocating for vigorous prosecution of domestic violence, another
crime that had been historically underprosecuted, Professor
Michelle Madden Dempsey emphasizes that the path to victims’
true healing can begin only when they cease to be victims and become in charge of relating the narratives of their victimization.313
Critical race scholars further expose the interrelationship between marginalized defendants and marginalized victims, stressing that the criminal legal system adversely effects both. For example, Professor James Forman provides a nuanced account of the
complex interdependence between victims’ and offenders’ interests.314 Forman demonstrates the surprising roles that Black community leaders, as well as Black prosecutors and judges, have
played in facilitating overly punitive measures, which

308. See Bruce A. Green, Prosecutorial Discretion: The Difficulty and Necessity of Public
Inquiry, 123 DICK. L. REV. 589, 612 (2019) (noting that prosecutors may choose to take account of these preferences, among other considerations).
309. See MARKUS DIRK DUBBER, VICTIMS IN THE WAR ON CRIME: THE USE AND ABUSE OF
VICTIMS’ RIGHTS 154–55 (2002); Paul G. Cassell, Treating Crime Victims Fairly: Integrating
Victims into the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 2007 UTAH L. REV. 861, 863 (2007).
310. See STEPHANOS BIBAS, THE MACHINERY OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 91 (2012) (“While defendants have strong interests in fair trials, victims likewise have strong personal interests
in being listened to and taken seriously.”).
311. See Stephanos Bibas & Richard A. Bierschbach, Integrating Remorse and Apology
into Criminal Procedure, 114 YALE L.J. 85, 138 (2004).
312. See Bibas, supra note 60, at 993.
313. See MICHELLE MADDEN DEMPSEY, PROSECUTING DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: A
PHILOSOPHICAL ANALYSIS 196, 208 (2009).
314. See FORMAN, supra note 45, at 10.
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disproportionally affected Black defendants.315 This was possible,
contends Forman, because of the need to heed Black victims’ interests and demands for effectively addressing the skyrocketing crime
rates in Washington, D.C. in the 1970s and 1980s, when “[B]lack
communities were devastated by historically unprecedented levels
of crime and violence.”316
Commentators further stress the important independent values
of criminal trials for crime victims.317 For example, Professor
Mihailis Diamantis argues that victims become “active narrators”
and “agents of justice” by testifying at trial.318 In failing to prosecute wrongdoers, he continues, the criminal legal system not only
becomes complicit in past victimization but also in future victimization, especially of vulnerable populations.319 Likewise, Professor
Zachary Kaufman argues that sexual assault victims’ interests in
prosecution ought to be taken into account when considering imposing criminal responsibility for third parties’ failure to intervene
in preventing sexual assault.320
Other commentators critique the recent proliferation of victims’
rights laws and their expansion under state constitutions, asserting that incorporating participation rights in the criminal process
itself poses significant risks to defendants’ due process rights. 321
Elaborating on these amendments exceeds the scope of this Article
because they apply only after a criminal proceeding is already underway, thus having no impact on prosecutors’ declining to pursue
sexual assault charges.322
The EPM I develop here stresses that victims’ interests should
play a prominent role in prosecutors’ charging decisions, especially
in cases implicating the interests of victims of underprosecuted
crimes like sexual assault. Bringing charges against perpetrators
of sexual violence provides victims with the opportunity to share
their narratives and publicly relay their victimization accounts.

315. Id. at 9–11.
316. Id. at 10.
317. See Mihailis E. Diamantis, Invisible Victims, 2022 WISC. L. REV. (forthcoming).
318. Id. at 32.
319. Id. at 33–34.
320. See Zachary D. Kaufman, Protectors of Predators or Prey: Bystanders and Upstanders Amid Sexual Crimes, 92 S. CAL. L. REV. 1317, 1337–38 (2019) (discussing this idea in
the context of duty-to-report laws).
321. See Anna Roberts, Victims, Right?, 42 CARDOZO L. REV. 1449, 1462, 1482–87 (2021)
(criticizing the proliferation of Marsy’s laws).
322. See Brown, supra note 47, at 862.
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The legal system’s refusal to pursue sexual assault charges results
in preventing victims from testifying, which is in itself a form of
silencing.323 Criminal prosecution of sexual assault serves particularly important expressive values for crime victims and society at
large precisely because their voices have been traditionally silenced.324
Incorporating the notion of victims’ interests into prosecutors’
charging decisions warrants one clarification and one caveat. First,
the EPM by no means suggests that defendants’ rights and victims’
interests carry equal weight. They do not; defendants’ liberty interests are at stake in criminal prosecutions and the EPM concedes
that prosecutors should prioritize defendants’ constitutional protections. Instead, my more modest claim is that an equitable criminal legal system requires exercising fairness and justice to both
offenders and victims and that the prosecutor’s role is to equitably
balance between their conflicting rights and interests. The position
I espouse here suggests that prosecutors take into consideration
sexual assault victims’ interests in holding those who harmed them
criminally accountable, as one of many factors in their charging
decisions.
Second, the EPM recognizes that in balancing the various considerations underlying their charging decisions, prosecutors
should also take into account victims’ interests not to pursue criminal charges where they are reluctant to partake in the criminal
process. Conventional wisdom is that states’ and victims’ interests
are aligned as public prosecution rests on bringing charges against
offenders who perpetrate harms against broad societal interests,
which inherently encompass victims’ interests as wells.325 But this
assumption sometimes proves inaccurate in circumstances where
the state’s interest in pursuing criminal charges and victims’ interests not to pursue them directly clash.
Sexual assault victims are not monolithic, but rather are a divergent group, consisting of diverse individuals, from varied racial,
ethnic, socioeconomic, and sexual identity backgrounds, which
shape their preferences regarding a subsequent criminal

323. See Tom Lininger, The Sound of Silence: Holding Batterers Accountable for Silencing Their Victims, 87 TEX. L. REV. 857, 906–07, 910 (2009).
324. Id. at 866; Kaufman, supra note 320, at 1325–26.
325. See Douglas Evan Beloof, The Third Model of Criminal Process: The Victim Participation Model, 1999 UTAH L. REV. 289, 294, 298 (1999).
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process.326 Many victims do not wish to participate in the criminal
adjudication process for various reasons. Some find the engagement with the legal system to be a re-victimizing experience, which
is unresponsive to their unique needs for healing.327 Importantly,
many victims have lost any trust in the criminal legal system,
which they perceive as racist and unjust, especially to people of
color.328
Critical race scholars make a strong case for minority victims’
decisions not to partake in what they view as the inherently destructive power of the carceral state.329 Choosing to disengage the
state’s coercive legal system altogether, many Black victims, including victims of gender-based violence, have made a conscious
decision not to rely on police and prosecutors because of the pervasive adverse impact of these institutions on their communities. 330
Given the profound mistrust of these institutions, states and victims’ interests often diverge; while the state might have an interest
in criminally pursuing a case, marginalized victims might have a
strong interest to not cooperate with a system which they view as
disproportionately oppressive to minorities.
Taking seriously victims’ interests requires that prosecutors
take into account the choices of those victims who wish to avoid
pursuing criminal charges. 331 The EPM recognizes the need for respecting victims’ rights to choose whether they want to pursue
criminal prosecution or prefer not to engage with the state’s coercive power. Dignity and respect for victims’ choices as autonomous
persons mandates that the law provides them with the right to decide whether alternative measures to redress their harms may better fit their specific needs.332

326. See Bazelon & Green, supra note 54, at 295–96.
327. Id. at 294–97 (observing that many victims believe that they would have been better
served by more beneficial alternatives to remedying their harms).
328. See Kimberly A. Thomas, Beyond Mitigation: Towards a Theory of Allocution,
75 FORDHAM L. REV. 2641, 2643 (2007); Alexandra Natapoff, Speechless: The Silencing of
Criminal Defendants, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1449, 1452–53 (2005); Black Survivors and Sexual
Trauma, TIME’S UP (May 20, 2020), https://timesupfoundation.org/black-survivors-andsexual-trauma/ [https://perma.cc/QY6Z-F5FB].
329. See BETH E. RICHIE, COMPELLED TO CRIME: THE GENDER ENTRAPMENT OF
BATTERED BLACK WOMEN 157 (1996).
330. Id. at 33–36, 133–34.
331. See LEIGH GOODMARK, DECRIMINALIZNG DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: A BALANCED POLICY
APPROACH TO INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE 121–22, 136, 138, 140, 143, 145 (2018) (emphasizing domestic violence victims right not to pursue charges).
332. See Alexandra Brodsky, Against Taking Rape “Seriously”: The Case Against Mandatory Referral Laws for Campus Gender Violence, 53 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 131, 150
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The suggestion that prosecutors take into consideration sexual
assault victims’ interests in their charging decisions calls for identifying the legal source underlying these interests. The next section
explains that such source may be found in a civil rights approach
to conceptualizing victims’ interests.
C. A Civil Rights Approach Underpinning the Prosecutor’s Role
A key feature of the EPM is that prosecutors must equitably balance between the competing rights and interests of offenders and
victims in making charging decisions. While the requirement that
prosecutors act in a fair and just way seems undisputed, fairness
and justness are indeterminate concepts, and prosecutors hold
vastly different perspectives on what this entails. A principled theory of the prosecutor’s role must therefore provide concrete guidelines to inform the prosecutor’s understanding of what it means to
exercise their discretion in an equitable manner. The EPM does
that by suggesting that a civil rights approach may underpin the
prosecutor’s role in exercising their discretion in a fair and just
manner to defendants, victims, and the public at large.
1. States’ Duties Under a Civil Rights Approach
Invoking a civil rights approach calls for untangling the inextricable link between prosecutors’ obligations to act in an equitable
manner and states’ duties to protect individuals from all forms of
violence, including among others, sexual violence.333 States’ duty
to provide people with personal safety and security and to protect
them from harms perpetrated against them by private actors has
long been perceived as a feature of the social contract theory.334
Criminal law scholars observe that in a criminal case, the government has a compelling interest in the protection of individuals
from private violence and expropriation of an interest which is constitutionally mandated.335

(2018).
333. See generally William S. Laufer & Robert Hughes, Justice Undone, 58 AM. CRIM. L.
REV. 155 (2021) (discussing the state’s omission to respond to crime and state’s duty to provide justice to all crime victims).
334. See Anita L. Allen, Social Contract Theory in American Case Law, 51 FLA. L. REV.
1, 30–33 (1999) (noting that under Locke’s social theory contract, a main function of the
state is to protect the physical integrity of individuals).
335. See Kate Stith, The Government’s Interest in Criminal Law: Whose Interest Is It
Anyway?, in PUBLIC VALUES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 137, 139–40 (Stephen E. Gottlieb ed.,
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In recent years, several commentators further suggest that
states’ duty to protect their citizens from private violence should
be viewed through the lens of a civil rights approach. For example,
African-American studies Professor Naomi Murakawa argues that
“the first civil right is the freedom from violence, and the state’s
fundamental task is to provide safety for all its citizens, particularly those who might be especially vulnerable or might lack the
political power to address widespread violence.”336
Professor Robin West grounds a state’s duty to protect its citizens from violent harm in a civil rights framework. Rejecting the
conventional wisdom that civil rights ought to be understood
merely as antidiscrimination rights, West argues that a state’s
duty to protect people from private violence ought to be understood
as an individual’s civil right to physical security.337 Civil rights are
those that protect individuals’ enjoyment of fundamental human
capabilities against unjust impediments, continues West, including individuals’ rights of access to protected social goods and systems of law.338 Emphasizing that civil rights are rights to state protection unlike constitutional rights which are rights from state
interference, West asserts that states have an obligation to actively
facilitate, promote and protect people by engaging in positive state
action, as only the state can provide civil rights.339 In turn, she continues, individuals have an interest in the states’ provision of these
civil rights, so the individuals would be able to enjoy their right to
physical security. Therefore, people have a civil right to laws that
criminalize private violence as well as a right to an effective and
trustworthy police force that protects against private violence in a
nondiscriminatory way and without violating rights of privacy and
dignity.340 West concludes by stating that “[t]he thoroughly positive right to thoroughly positive, state-provided protection against
thoroughly private violence is a—maybe the—quintessential civil
right: it is a right that can only be realized through the enactment
of positive law and its fair enforcement.”341

1993).
336. See NAOMI MURAKAWA, THE FIRST CIVIL RIGHT: HOW LIBERALS BUILT PRISON
AMERICA 50 (2014).
337. See Robin West, Toward a Jurisprudence of the Civil Rights Acts, in A NATION OF
WIDENING OPPORTUNITIES? THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT AT FIFTY 73 (Samuel Bagenstos & Ellen
Katz eds., 2014).
338. Id. at 75, 82–83.
339. Id. at 74–75, 96–97.
340. Id.
341. Id. at 96–97.
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The civil rights perspective connects states’ duties to protect individuals against all forms of private violence with victims’ interests in having an effective, fair, and just public institution whose
role is to prosecute those suspected of depriving individuals of their
personal security. One derivative interest emanating from people’s
right to be protected against violence concerns the decision
whether the state should use the criminal law in response to sexual
assault on their agency and autonomy.342
The institution of public prosecution is the thread that links
states’ duties to protect individuals against acts of private violence
perpetrated against them with prosecutors’ duties to do that. In
adopting the public prosecution model, states delegated to prosecutors their duty to protect individuals from all forms of violence,
including sexual violence.343 Although most crimes were privately
prosecuted until the late eighteenth century, individuals have
since delegated to states the power to initiate private justice.344
Public prosecution is premised on the understanding that it is the
state’s exclusive role to bring criminal charges against perpetrators and vindicate public harms in the name of victims.345 By holding a monopoly on the operation of the public prosecution model,
states created a system that invites citizens to rely on this system
for protection against harm.346
The civil rights approach explains why a prosecutor’s role should
be conceived as a duty owed to crime victims. The conventional account that prosecutors merely have discretionary power to bring
criminal charges obscures the obligatory nature of the duty that
prosecutors owe to the public in general and to victims in particular. The failure to effectively prosecute sexual assault illustrates
the significance of casting the prosecutor’s role in an obligatory
framework. By criminalizing sexual assault, states channeled the
treatment of sexual violence into the criminal legal system. The
prosecutor’s role thus consists of a duty to equitably prosecute
342. See DUBBER, supra note 309, at 335–36 (noting that crime victims have a subordinate right to participate in the prosecutor’s decision whether to bring criminal charges).
343. See Mary Margaret Giannini, Redeeming an Empty Promise: Procedural Justice, the
Crime Victims’ Rights to Be Reasonably Protected from the Accused, 78 TENN. L. REV. 47, 52
(2010).
344. See Bennett Capers, Against Prosecutors, 105 CORNELL L. REV. 1561, 1574–81
(2021); see also Michael Edmund O’Neill, Private Vengeance and the Public Good, 12 UNIV.
PA. J. CONST. L. 659, 665, 670–71 (2010).
345. See Lauren M. Ouziel, Beyond Law and Fact: Jury Evaluation of Law Enforcement,
92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 691, 718–19 (2016).
346. See Brown, supra note 47, at 867–70.
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sexual assault to protect all people against sexual violence. The refusal to bring sexual assault charges in cases where there is probable cause that a sexual assault has been committed and sufficient
evidence to support the charges deprives people of a public good,
namely state protection against sexual violence. The result of such
deprivation is that public goods are not equally distributed because
they are only provided to some victims but not others. 347 The underprosecution of sexual assault thus violates states’ duties as conceptualized through the civil rights perspective.
Moreover, grounding the prosecution of sexual assault in a civil
rights underpinning complements the constitutional-based framework that commentators have proposed to address the underenforcement of sexual assault. Professor Deborah Tuerkheimer advances such a framework by arguing that underenforcing sexual
assault crimes violates states’ constitutional mandate to equally
protect all citizens, thus creating a constitutional violation under
the Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause.348 The underenforcement of sexual assault crimes perpetrated against marginalized victims, she continues, underscores the ways in which
prosecutors perpetuate harms on particular communities by failing to provide them with the equal protection of the state.349 Withholding states’ protective resources from a group of crime victims,
Tuerkheimer concludes, is a hallmark of inequality.350 While the
constitutional framework for understanding the underenforcement
of sexual assault problem is persuasive, further adding the civil
rights underpinning offers yet another theoretical basis to support
states’ duties to strengthen the prosecution of sexual assault and
protect people from private sexual violence.
Moreover, applying a civil rights approach to the underprosecution of sexual assault adds a normative dimension to states’ duties
to protect against sexual violence, especially when perpetrated

347. See Natapoff, supra note 23, at 1717 (“Underenforcement . . . [as] a form of deprivation, tracking familiar categories of race, gender, class, and political powerlessness. Conceived as a form of public policy, underenforcement is a crucial distribution mechanism
whereby the social good of lawfulness can be withheld.”).
348. See Tuerkheimer, supra note 24, at 1334–35 (describing DOJ findings that law enforcement discriminatory practices that failed to respond to sexual assault cases violated
the Equal Protection Clause).
349. Id.
350. Id. at 1288–89 n.5 (clarifying that the argument focuses on police failures to effectively investigate sexual assault, but that many of the arguments also apply for the underprosecution of these cases).
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against marginalized communities.351 The underprosecution of
sexual assault carries distinct implications for marginalized victims who have traditionally suffered from discriminatory enforcement of the law and systemic biased treatment by the criminal legal system’s institutional players. The prosecutor’s refusal to bring
sexual assault charges exemplifies a deprivation of state protection
from those who need it the most, given the intersectional dimensions of gender, race, class, social orientation, and other factors
contributing to victims’ marginalization.352
A civil rights approach is normatively warranted because it allows prosecutors to take into account broad social justice goals in
their charging decisions, especially when these implicate the interests of marginalized victims who experience gender-, race-, and
other class-based biases and prejudices. A civil rights perspective
emphasizes policy-driven reform by highlighting the societal implications of prosecutors’ charging choices. These choices carry the
prospect of shaping social norms by sending expressive messages
about what kinds of harm, as well as what types of victims, warrant the law’s protection.
2. Progressive Prosecutors and the Civil Rights Approach
The interrelation between the underprosecution of sexual assault and the civil rights approach is not merely theoretical but
also has important practical implications. These are manifested in
a growing phenomenon among various prosecutors’ offices around
the nation of vigorously prosecuting crimes that have been traditionally underprosecuted including sexual assault.353 The phenomenon has mostly taken hold in large cities, but, infrequently, it also
emerges in rural areas where elected prosecutors adopt reformist
policies.354
351. Id. at 1289–90 n.9.
352. See supra section II.B.3 (discussing the intersectionality of multiple factors contributing to victims’ marginalization).
353. See Levin, supra note 42, at 1438–39 (describing various forms of progressive prosecutors who seek to amp up the prosecution of underprosecuted crimes like sexual assault).
354. See Maybell Romero, Rural Spaces, Communities of Color, and the Progressive Prosecutor, 110 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 803, 816 (2020); cf. Maine Prosecutor Aims to Reform
Prosecuting Sexual Assaults, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Jan. 31, 2020), https://apnews.com/article/7596a4aec6a71c1d435cda0c93b84173 [https://perma.cc/2WG4-FNK2] (describing how
Natasha Irving, a District Attorney in Waldo County, Maine, advances prosecutorial practices that promote equitable treatment of communities who have been historically underprotected by the law and how Irving’s campaign platform emphasized her commitment to
improving the investigation and prosecution of gender-based crimes, domestic violence, and
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In recent years, many elected district attorneys implement policies and practices that reimagine a new role for prosecutors, a phenomenon commonly referred to as progressive prosecution.355
While running for office, these prosecutors have campaigned on advancing institutional reforms aimed at changing the profoundly
flawed criminal legal system.356 Among their goals has been a commitment to a more balanced approach to criminal enforcement, including reducing mass incarceration and its racial disparities, rectifying its disproportionate effects on defendants of color and other
marginalized defendants, and decreasing wrongful convictions.357
To accomplish these objectives, progressive prosecutors mostly focus on ameliorating problems of over prosecution, among others,
by refusing to file charges in misdemeanors such as possession of
marijuana.358
This conventional account of progressive prosecutors’ initiatives,
which largely emphasizes problems of overenforcement, obfuscates
a less visible feature underlying these progressive prosecutors’
practices, one that emphasizes the parallel phenomenon of underenforcement of specific types of crimes. Many progressive prosecutors, however, recognize the interconnectedness of over- and
underenforcement of crimes; they stress that meaningful reform of
the criminal legal system must also encompass a robust prosecution of crimes that have been traditionally underprosecuted.359
Importantly, progressive prosecutors are by no means monolithic. Commentators observe that the broad concept captures distinct categories of prosecutors’ platforms, each reflecting a different vision of what is wrong with the criminal legal system and
whether and to what extent prosecutors might help in remedying
these wrongs.360 Elaborating on the disparate flavors of progressive
prosecutors exceeds the scope of this Article. Instead, I exclusively
focus here on one type of progressive prosecutor, which I refer to
as a Civil Rights Reformist (“CRR prosecutor”). 361
sexual assault).
355. See David Alan Sklansky, The Progressive Prosecutor’s Handbook, 50 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. ONLINE 25, 26 (2017).
356. See Levin, supra note 42, at 1424.
357. Id. at 1437–39 (mapping the different types of progressive prosecutors).
358. See Note, The Paradox of “Progressive Prosecution,” 132 HARV. L. REV. 748, 752
(2018).
359. See supra notes 339, 345, 354 and accompanying text.
360. See Levin, supra note 42, at 1447.
361. Id. at 1418 (using the term “the prosecutorial progressive” to refer to this type of
prosecutor). For an account that uses the term “reformist prosecutor,” see Editorial Board, A
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The CRR prosecutor’s vision is rooted in concerns about structural inequality, systemic racism, and substantive social justice,
and is motivated towards advancing certain political priorities.362
Importantly, the CRR prosecutor draws on ideas that are conceptually similar to the civil rights approach discussed earlier when
making charging decisions that are aimed at remedying historical
inequalities, discrimination, and biases against marginalized victims.363 To promote broad policy goals, the CRR prosecutor advances, among others, prosecutorial practices that robustly pursue
criminal charges in cases involving underprosecuted crimes.364
These crimes are largely perpetrated against marginalized victims
that the law had historically failed to protect, thus these prosecutors’ practices aim to rectify systemic social injustices, including
racialized and gendered discriminatory enforcement and biases.365
For example, CRR prosecutors seek to counteract an overly punitive and systemically racist criminal legal system by rigorously
prosecuting police officers who have violated the law.366 The paradigm example includes filing charges against those who have unjustifiably killed Black victims.367
CRR prosecutors, however, implement practices and policies
that draw on the civil rights approach only in a sporadic manner.
This is because currently there is no principled theoretical framework underpinning their practical operation. Moreover, CRR prosecutors may be perceived as uncritically heeding to political pressures and succumbing to public demands.368 The civil rights
underpinning for the EPM that I develop here conceptually aligns
with practices that CRR prosecutors employ in bolstering prosecution of underprosecuted crimes. Yet, the proposed model adds a
much needed theoretical support to undergird these prosecutorial
reforms, thus, ameliorating concerns that public pressure might
disproportionately shape prosecutors’ charging decisions.
One important aspect of CRR prosecutors’ agendas includes robustly prosecuting sexual assault.369 Bringing more sexual assault
Wiser Generation of Prosecutors, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 6, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2
017/02/06/opinion/a-wiser-generation-of-prosecutors.html [https://perma.cc/T3HQ-WPRD].
362. Levin, supra note 42, at 1438.
363. See supra section III.C.1.
364. See Bellin, supra note 38, at 1222, 1251.
365. See id.
366. See id. at 1205, 1218, 1222.
367. See Note, supra note 358, at 749, 754–55.
368. See Bellin, supra note 38, at 1248–53.
369. See supra text accompanying notes 345–64.
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charges serves to combat patriarchal biases in the enforcement of
crimes that are largely perpetrated against women, amplifying
harms that have long been ignored. By recognizing the roles that
these prosecutions play in fostering a more equitable criminal legal
system, CRR prosecutors highlight the inexorable connection between problems of over- and underprosecution. They further
acknowledge their dual-pronged duties to protect defendants from
excessive use of the state’s penal power on one hand and provide
state protection to sexual assault victims on the other. This approach embraces a group oriented civil rights approach, which incorporates victims’ interests in holding wrongdoers accountable.
Many prosecutors’ offices across the United States now illustrate
this reformist approach. San Francisco’s District Attorney Chesa
Boudin, a former public defender, is believed to be the first prosecutor in the country to promote initiatives that endeavor to integrate meaningful reforms in the prosecution of sexual assault.370
Boudin’s election campaign included, among others, a commitment
to address problems of selective processing and continuous backlog
and to amplify sexual assault victims’ voices. 371 Boudin stated that
“[b]eing a progressive prosecutor is about more than just ending
mass incarceration and the racial injustice plaguing our criminal
justice system . . . . It requires treating sex crimes with the seriousness they demand, and treating victims/survivors with the compassion they deserve.”372
To better facilitate the prosecution of sexual assault, Boudin created a six-point plan that draws on a victim-centered approach to
prosecuting these crimes.373 The plan included measures to testing
all rape kits, process up-to-date toxicology tests, establish a sex
crimes review team, implement mandatory sexual assault trainings, establish a sexual violence task force and give victims a voice

370. See DA’s Office Launches Pilot Program to Expand Toxicology Tests for Sexual
Assault Survivors, SFGATE (Oct. 15, 2020), https://www.sfgate.com/news/bayarea/artic
le/Da-s-Office-Launches-Pilot-Program-To-Expand-15651937.php [https://perma.cc/K2YVMA6V].
371. See Marissa Hoechstetter, Can a Prosecutor be Progressive and Take Sex Crimes
Seriously?, THE APPEAL (Jan. 8, 2020), https://theappeal.org/progressive-prosecutors-metoo/
[https://perma.cc/GMD5-DYQX].
372. Seamus Kirst, These Progressive Prosecutors Want to Reshape Justice in Major
American Cities, TEEN VOGUE (July 29, 2019), https://www.teenvogue.com/story/meet-progressive-prosecutors-krasner-rollins-boudin-owens-caban [https://perma.cc/9PMJ-2ZXL].
373. Tim Redmond, DA Candidates Address SF’s Failures in Sexual Assault Cases,
48HILLS (June 25, 2019), https://48hills.org/2019/06/da-candidates-address-citys-failures-insexual-assault-cases/ [https://perma.cc/8QPX-RV5S].
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in every case.374 Recognizing that sexual assault survivors are
among the most vulnerable victims, one feature that particularly
stands out in this plan is Boudin’s commitment to proactively prosecute sex crimes perpetrated against underserved communities.375
This policy emphasizes the discriminatory implications of the
state’s failure to prosecute sexual assault crimes whose victims
have long been marginalized. This approach brings home the point
that the underprosecution of sexual assault crimes and the overprosecution of most crimes ought to be viewed as the flip sides of
the same coin.
Other district attorneys have similarly advanced prosecutorial
practices that are consistent with the civil rights underpinning to
the prosecution of sexual assault. Larry Krasner, Philadelphia’s
District Attorney, also aims to promote reformist prosecutorial policies that invigorate sexual assault prosecutions.376 For example,
Krasner’s office charged Carl Holmes, a high-ranking police officer
in the Philadelphia Police Department with sexual assault and related offenses of three female police officers during his tenure as
Inspector and Chief Inspector.377 The incidents occurred fifteen
years earlier, but no criminal charges were previously brought
against Holmes.378 Filing charges in this case, despite the passage
of time, signals a prosecutorial commitment to eradicate sexual violence, particularly in cases where perpetrators abused their positions of authority to coerce sexual demands from victims in vulnerable positions.379
Brooklyn’s District Attorney Eric Gonzales provides yet another
notable example of a CRR prosecutor whose policies and practices
emphasize the interrelationship between the underprosecution of

374. Chesa Boudin, Chesa Boudin Pledges Survivor-First Approach to Sex Assault,
OAKLAND NEWS NOW (June 25, 2019), https://oaklandnewsnow.com/chesa-boudin-pledgessurvivor-first-approach-to-sex-assault/ [https://perma.cc/6WTL-JPVJ].
375. Id.
376. Larry Will Continue to Attack Mass Incarceration and Work to Prevent Violence,
KRASNER FOR DA, https://krasnerforda.com/plans-for-the-future [https://perma.cc/DDY63XKX].
377. The charges were filed after a Grand Jury heard testimonies from three unrelated
complainants who testified that Holmes kissed, groped, and digitally penetrated them, without their consent. See Grand Jury Documents at 1, In re: The Thirtieth County Investigating
Grand Jury, No. 0008094-2018 (C.P. Phila. 2018).
378. Id. at 1–2 (elaborating the three complainant’s allegations against Holmes, describing sexual assaults that Holmes allegedly committed as early as 2004, and the Grand Jury’s
2019 findings recommending that Holmes be charged with the alleged sexual offenses).
379. See Buchhandler-Raphael, supra note 66, at 151–54 (advocating a sexual abuse of
power model to address such abuses).
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sexual assault and a civil rights approach to victims’ interests.380
His office’s prosecutorial agenda explicitly recognizes the critical
role that victims’ interests play in the prosecution of sexual assault, promising to take into considerations their views about case
dispositions.381 Likewise, Gonzales stresses that a progressive
prosecutor’s office must value transparency and accountability.382
Like other CRR prosecutors, Gonzales explicitly connects the
phenomena of over- and underprosecution. In an elaborate, publicly available document, entitled Action Plan, Gonzales provides a
thorough, detailed roadmap for actions that capture his reformist
vision for an alternative prosecutorial model.383 The Action Plan
mostly focuses on ameliorating problems of overincarceration and
other punitive measures which disproportionately affect marginalized communities, but also stresses the need to address the underprosecution of sexual assault. More specifically, in a section titled
“Enhance prosecution of cases of gender-based violence, including
acquaintance rape and sexual assault cases,” the Action Plan calls
for applying enhanced evidence gathering techniques early on in
sexual assault cases.384 It also emphasizes the need to ensure that
the Special Victims Bureau, handling sexual assault crimes in
Brooklyn, is sufficiently resourced.385 Additionally, the plan advocates for adopting innovative strategies for prosecuting drug-facilitated and alcohol-facilitated sexual assault.386
Lastly, a recent iteration of a prosecutorial civil rights approach
is exemplified by George Gascón, Los Angeles County District Attorney, yet another CRR prosecutor whose running campaign
rested on a reformist platform.387 Improving the enforcement of
sexual assault crimes is among Gascón’s many proposed reforms of

380. See ERIC GONZALEZ, JUSTICE 2020: AN ACTION PLAN FOR BROOKLYN (2020),
https://www.brooklynda.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/Justice2020-Report.pdf [https://pe
rma.cc/MY34-2DV3].
381. Id. (“We can only achieve the best outcomes for survivors when prosecutors include
them in the handling of their cases. Keeping survivors informed about the status of their
cases, regularly consulting them, and taking into account their views about case dispositions
can help establish a dynamic that is victim-centered and promotes their recovery.”).
382. Id. at 29.
383. Id. at 3–9.
384. Id. at 35.
385. Id.
386. Id.
387. See James Queally, On First Day As L.A. County D.A., George Gascón Eliminates Bail,
Remakes Sentencing Rules, L.A. TIMES (Dec. 7, 2020, 6:51 PM), https://www.latimes.com/cali
fornia/story/2020-12-07/in-first-day-on-job-gascon-remakes-bail-sentencing-rules [https://p
erma.cc/6UVX-6CC7].
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the criminal legal system’s operation in Los Angeles.388 Gascón’s
plan includes advancing the prosecution of sexual assault in partnership with law enforcement and community members to prevent sexual violence, hold offenders accountable, and ensure that each survivor finds their own path to healing and recovery.389 This plan
emphasizes taking steps like testing every rape kit, developing a sexual assault response team, increasing survivors voice and choice, protecting the LGBTQ community and advocating for victims of uncharged cases to have the opportunity to read a victim impact
statement at the sentencing of a serial sex offender.390
Importantly, CRR prosecutors’ reformist policies and practices
offer an internal organizational mechanism for exercising oversight of prosecutors’ decisions that decline to bring sexual assault
charges to trial. Scholars have long cast doubt on the effectiveness
of external oversight mechanisms, such as judicial review, for
shaping prosecutors’ behavior.391 A case-by-case review, they continue, is poorly suited to policing broader systemic concerns such
as equality across different prosecutors.392 Instead, these scholars
advocate for internal governance measures implemented within
prosecutors’ offices, which prosecutors could use to regulate themselves.393 These include, among other things, inculcating professional culture that focuses on exercising fairness in prosecution
policies as well as using internal substantive guidelines which
could shape offices values and norms and harmonize prosecutors’
substantive results.394
Furthermore, embracing a principled civil rights approach to the
prosecution of sexual assault fosters more transparent policies
which also result in more consistency in individual prosecutors’
charging decisions.395 Studies confirm that prosecutors respond to
a blend of social norms and values and that internal regulations
388. See Sexual Assault—Protecting and Holding Abusers Accountable, GEORGE
GASCÓN, https://www.georgegascon.org/on-the-issues/#assault [https://perma.cc/V2MF-45
WD].
389. George Gascón’s Proposed Policies and Guidelines for Protecting Victims of Domestic
Violence, Sex Assault and Human Trafficking, and Holding Abusers Accountable, GEORGE
GASCÓN (Jan. 23, 2020), https://www.georgegascon.org/campaign-news/gascon-policies-forprotecting-victims-of-dv-sexual-assault-ht-and-holding-abusers-accountable/ [https://perma
.cc/2NG9-MXGQ].
390. Id.
391. See Bibas, supra note 60, at 960, 1003.
392. Id. at 972–73.
393. Id. at 964.
394. Id. at 997, 1003.
395. Id. at 993.
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within prosecutors’ offices, initiated and enforced by the offices’
leaders, produce predictable and consistent prosecutorial
choices.396
In sum, the growing wave of prosecutors who advance reformist
agendas that are attentive to social justice goals carries promising
potential for regulating prosecutorial discretion, advancing transparency and consistency within the office, and providing much
needed internal oversight. This approach is cognizant of the interrelation between the over- and underprosecution phenomena. As
such, it offers hope for adopting reforms that implement a prosecutorial model that is fairer and more just to both defendants and
victims as stakeholders in the criminal legal system.
D. #MeToo Meets BLM: Reconciling Tensions Between Conflicting
Objectives
Endeavors to invigorate the prosecution of sexual assault are
likely to raise a host of objections; these include a general anticriminalization argument, denouncing the exclusive dependence on the
criminal legal system as the quintessential solution to solve all society’s problems, as well as a more specific claim, rooted in intersectional feminism, urging feminists to disengage the criminal law
in addressing the problem of sexual assault.397
First, those rejecting the use of criminal law as a vehicle for social control are likely to raise a broad argument, under which criminal law is not only unhelpful in reducing harmful behaviors but
also has a destructive impact on minority communities, with disproportionately adverse effects on communities of color. 398 Since
its multiple harms outweigh any potential benefits, the argument
continues, progressive criminal law reformers ought to disengage
punitive measures that only strengthen the harmful effect of the
carceral state.399 Consequently, supporting the goals of the M4BL
requires divestment from criminal enforcement.400

396. See Miller & Wright, supra note 69, at 129, 176.
397. See Kimberlé W. Crenshaw, From Private Violence to Mass Incarceration: Thinking
Intersectionally About Women, Race, and Social Control, 59 UCLA L. REV. 1418, 1466
(2012).
398. See BUTLER, supra note 45, at 9–10 (analyzing the racially disparate effects of mass
incarceration); Jonathan Simon, A Radical Need for Criminology, 40 SOC. JUST. 9, 9 (2014).
399. See Simon, supra note 398, at 9.
400. See Akbar, supra note 40, at 435, 442.
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Commentators further reject the proliferation of “progressive
punitivism,” which they define as measures that wield punitive
weapons for the purpose of promoting social equality, including
shaming, stigmatization, harsh punishments and denial of rehabilitation.401 Progressive punitivism is especially prevalent in the
area of sexual assault, the argument continues, given calls to hold
accountable individuals who are perceived as belonging to powerful groups.402 This account denounces the celebration of “progressive prosecutors” advancing carceral policies, by emphasizing the
risks associated with relying on prosecutors to deliver transformative reform.403
Second, intersectional scholars condemn feminists’ continued reliance on the criminal law to remedy the harms of gender-based
violence, including both domestic violence and sexual assault.404
Professor Aya Gruber’s recent book, The Feminist War on Crime,
fiercely rejects feminists’ engaging carceral policies as a means to
promote gender justice, calling feminists to disengage criminalization measures and adopt instead a neofeminism agenda.405 Furthermore, commentators criticize a phenomenon they refer to as
“carceral exceptionalism,” where progressive prosecutors create
“carve outs” for sexual assault crimes, calling for harsher carceral
sanctions only for these crimes while simultaneously decrying
mass incarceration.406
These critiques are concededly justified, but only as they pertain
to crimes that are indeed overprosecuted. Yet, as this Article
demonstrates, sexual assault crimes are in fact under, rather than
overprosecuted. The above objections thus have only limited application in this specific context. Without minimizing these concerns,
I argue that they are overstated and largely undervalue the significance of competing considerations underlying the treatment of
sexual assault crimes.

401. See Hadar Aviram, Progressive Punitivism: Notes on the Use of Punitive Social Control to Advance Social Justice Ends, 68 BUFF. L. REV. 199, 201–02 (2020).
402. Id. at 205–06.
403. See Note, supra note 358, at 750.
404. See GRUBER, supra note 22; LEIGH GOODMARK, DECRIMINALIZING DOMESTIC
VIOLENCE 16 (2019).
405. GRUBER, supra note 22, at 68.
406. See Levin, supra note 42, at 1438–39, 1439 n.102 (arguing that instead of carving
out specific exemptions and exceptions to the enforcement of sexual assault, legislatures
and other criminal law’s institutional actors should advance reforms that aim to abolish the
carceral state in a way that is broadly applicable to all types of criminal enforcement and
all types of crimes, including gender-based violence).
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To begin with, a remarkable shortcoming of critiques advocating
for disengagement with the criminal law as a means to battle gender-based violence is that they fall short of providing any meaningful alternative to criminalization. The undeniable reality is that
sexual assault remains a uniquely harmful phenomenon that inflicts enormous injuries on victims. Yet, critics of criminal enforcement of sexual assault fail to offer any viable substitutes to criminalization that would not only work better and more effectively
address these crimes but also prevent future crimes.
Moreover, these critiques unnecessarily conflate criminalization
decisions with incarceration and other punitive sanctions. My call
for robust prosecution of sexual assault does not entail any support
for harsh sentencing for those convicted of these crimes because
trials have independent values beyond punishment.407 I am nowhere attempting to trivialize the concerns underlying the criminal legal system’s excessive reliance on punitive measures to address all forms of harmful behaviors or the urgent need to rectify
the systemic injustices and racial inequities underlying its operation. Instead, my more modest claim is that vigorous prosecution
of sexual assault should not result in contributing to mass incarceration because bringing sexual assault charges has important expressive objectives.
Critics of policies aimed at invigorating the prosecution of sexual
assault assume that doing so necessarily means contributing to the
problem of mass incarceration.408 This perceived connection, however, is by no means inevitable. Admittedly, bringing more sexual
assault charges creates inherent tensions between the destructive
impact of carceral policies on marginalized communities on one
hand and the state’s obligation to protect people from sexual violence on the other. Commentators who reject reliance on criminal
enforcement resolve these tensions simply by embracing a rule
that defendants’ interests always substantially outweigh the competing interests of the state and the victims and thus should necessarily prevail. 409
This categorical position, however, fails to balance the conflicting interests of all stakeholders in the criminal process, defendants
and victims alike. Such unqualified approach further neglects to
acknowledge that prosecutorial choices regarding whether to bring
407.
408.
409.

See Diamantis, supra note 317, at 24–28.
See GRUBER, supra note 22, at 15, 171.
Id. at 192.
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sexual assault charges are not only detrimental to particular sexual assault victims but also undermine normative social values,
including gender and racial equity.
Conversely, the position I advance in this Article concedes that
these tensions exist but asserts that they may be reconciled in a
manner that equitably balances between competing considerations. This could be done by weighing defendants’ interests to avoid
harsh sentences against victims’ interests in holding those who
sexually assaulted them criminally accountable.
In general, prosecutors’ decisions whether to file charges in all
cases always require weighing competing considerations.410 But
the need for balancing between conflicting interests of all stakeholders in the criminal process becomes more salient in the specific
area of sexual assault prosecutions because they are largely underprosecuted. Here, prosecutors should evaluate, on a case-by-case
basis, whether the potential benefits of bringing charges—given
the interests of the general public and the victim—outweigh the
potential pitfalls of the criminal process, including the harm to
marginalized defendants. Engaging in such a fact-specific balancing process ensures that prosecutors’ decisions about whether to
pursue sexual assault charges are fair and just to both defendants
and crime victims.
Moreover, progressive prosecutors’ carving out specific exceptions to their general policy of reducing the overall number of their
cases is normatively warranted to address the problem of underprosecution of sexual assault. Similar reasoning applies by analogy
to prosecuting police violence, yet another type of underprosecuted
crime. Most readers will likely agree that police violence is an exceptional category of crime that warrants prosecution. 411 Similarly, principled policy reasons also support carving out exceptions
for the prosecution of sexual assault, as both types of crime implicate discriminatory and unjust treatment of marginalized victims.
One overlooked way of reconciling the tensions between defendants and victims’ conflicting interests lies with disentangling criminalization decisions from incarceration policies and other punitive
sanctions.412 The conventional wisdom that intuitively links
410. See Eisenberg, supra note 153, at 893.
411. For a position that objects to the use of criminal prosecutions to address systemic
problem of police violence and racialized police, see Kate Levine, Police Prosecutions and
Punitive Instincts, 98 WASH. U. L. REV. 997, 1008 (2021).
412. Punitive measures also consist of additional measures such as sex offenders’
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criminalization with harsh punitive measures is not an inevitable
feature of criminal law, although prevalent “tough on crime” policies have made them inexorably linked. The criminal legal system
mostly draws on a flawed “punitivism or nothing” binary that exclusively relies on incarceration as the sole form of societal denunciation of criminal wrongdoing.413
Yet, there is nothing inherently contradictory in separating
criminalization decisions from considering how much punishment
is appropriate.414 In fact, there is a scholarly consensus that the
questions of what the criminal law should cover and what sentences are deserved are entirely separate.415 Professor Mihailis Diamantis, for example, proposes decoupling prosecutions from punishments by arguing that the criminal law ought to permit the
prosecution of those who cannot be punished due to reasons such
as death or immunity.416 Here, I argue that the criminal legal system should distinguish between strengthening the criminalization
of sexual assault, as these crimes have long been subject to underprosecution, while simultaneously decreasing incarceration rates
and expanding alternatives to punitive sanctions.
The prosecutorial model that I propose in this Article uses the
treatment of sexual assault as a case study to make a broader claim
about the criminal legal system’s need to divorce criminalization
from incarceration. To counterbalance the effects of vigorous prosecution of sexual assault against defendants’ right to equitable
treatment, the criminal legal system must envision innovative
ways to disentangle criminalization decisions from overpunitive
policies. Calling for increased sexual assault prosecutions should
not be equated with support for harsh carceral practices. Furthermore, it is not only entirely plausible but also conceptually consistent to advocate for a more robust prosecution of sexual assault
while simultaneously denouncing harsh incarceration of defendants convicted of these crimes.
Importantly, disentangling the criminalization discourse from
the notorious incarceration frenzy that dominated the criminal
registries. See generally Cynthia Godsoe, #MeToo and the Myth of the Juvenile Sex Offender,
17 OHIO STATE J. CRIM. L. 335, 349 (2020).
413. See Levin, supra note 43, at 262 (describing the mass incarceration critique).
414. See Sandeep Gopalan, Skilling’s Martyrdom: The Case for Criminalization Without
Incarceration, 44 U. S.F. L. REV. 459, 504 (2010).
415. See Dan Markel, Retributive Justice and the Demands of Democratic Citizenship, 1
VA. J. CRIM. L. 1, 94 (2012).
416. See Diamantis, supra note 317, at 4, 42.
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legal system brings home the point that, contrary to conventional
wisdom, the objectives of the #MeToo and BLM movements in fact
complement, rather than contradict each other. Both movements
advance social reforms that are aimed at remedying the legal system’s longstanding unfair and unjust treatment of marginalized
victims and defendants of crime.417 Similarly, they amplify minority voices that have historically been silenced under legal and social norms, thus contributing to the empowerment of marginalized
victims.
The respective goals of #MeToo and M4BL may therefore be reconciled and harmonized rather than pitted against each other. Enhancing the prosecution of sexual assault as the EPM proposes,
should not lead to subsequent expansions in punitive measures.
This may happen only if the criminal legal system acknowledges
the necessity of breaking the familiar connection between conviction and harsh incarceration. To ensure that this conceptual shift
is indeed translated into practice, the criminal law must focus on
developing effective substitutes to incarceration.
Divorcing criminalization from incarceration requires the implementation of a host of alternatives to punitive measures.418 The
“punitivism or nothing” paradigm that dominates the enforcement
of sexual assault crimes illustrates the utter lack of imagination
concerning the purposes of criminalization. This binary obscures
the fact that some important goals of criminalization, including
both general and specific deterrence, may be accomplished through
a host of alternative measures that reject harsh punitivism and
carceral practices.419
An important alternative measure draws on the expressive function of criminal enforcement. Commentators have long recognized
the criminal law’s expressive goal, identifying it as a separate justification for punishment, beyond deterrence and retributivism,
given the societal message that criminal conviction itself sends
through bringing wrongdoers to trial.420 Professor Joshua Kleinfeld
417. See Margo Kaplan, Reconciling #MeToo and Criminal Justice, 17 OHIO STATE J.
CRIM. L. 361, 382 (2020).
418. See Bernard E. Harcourt, Reducing Mass Incarceration: Lessons from the Deinstitutionalization of Mental Hospitals in the 1960s, 9 OHIO STATE J. CRIM. L. 53, 75 (2011).
419. See Dan M. Kahan, What Do Alternative Sanctions Mean?, 63 UNIV. CHI. L. REV.
591, 601–04, 631–34 (1996).
420. See Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of the Law, 144 UNIV. PA. L. REV.
2021, 2022 (1996); Richard H. McAdams, An Attitudinal Theory of Expressive Law, 70 OR.
L. REV. 339, 340 (2000); R.A. DUFF, PUNISHMENT, COMMUNICATION, AND COMMUNITY 79–
80 (2001); Elizabeth S. Anderson & Richard H. Pildes, Expressive Theories of Law: General
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has recently developed a version of expressivism referred to as reconstructivism, which focuses on the nature of criminal wrongdoing.421 It stresses criminal law’s function of reconstructing violated
normative order, supporting criminalization as a way of reaffirming society’s educative message that offenders’ devaluation of victims’ interests is wrong.422
Applying an expressivist-reconstructivist approach is especially
suitable for sexual assault crimes, as criminalization offers a powerful tool for conveying social messages that denounce sexual
wrongdoing.423 Professor Michelle Madden Dempsey suggests that
sexual assault prosecutions serve an important function of denunciating wrongdoers, thus promoting intrinsic and consequential
values.424 This expressive function, she continues, may be accomplished merely by the charging decision itself, even where conviction is unlikely.425
Taken together, carceral consequences should not be viewed as
an inevitable or necessary outcome of conviction. Holding wrongdoers criminally accountable for inflicting harm embodies societal
condemnation of sexual violence, in itself sending a compelling expressive message, and may suffice, without linking criminalization
to any additional punitive measures. Emphasizing the symbolic
message that criminalization embodies reaffirms the important
message that sexual violence will not be tolerated by the law, while
at the same time, recognizing that such affirmation could be accomplished without resorting to lengthy prison terms.
Another innovative measure to promote offenders’ accountability without reliance on punitive practices lies with restorative and
transformative justice alternatives to punishment. These programs establish offenders’ accountability rather than merely punishing them.426 In recent years, commentators elaborated on ways
that restorative and transformative justice programs may be
Restatement, 148 UNIV. PA. L. REV. 1503, 1504 (2000). Some scholars incorporate expressivism as one of the many strands of retributivism. See, e.g., Carissa Byrne Hessick, Motive’s
Role in Criminal Punishment, 80 S. CAL. L. REV. 89, 113 (2006).
421. See Joshua Kleinfeld, Reconstructivism: The Place of Criminal Law in Ethical Life,
129 HARV. L. REV. 1485, 1498 (2016).
422. Id. at 1513.
423. See TUERKHEIMER, CREDIBLE, supra note 122, at 217–23; Sheley, supra note 67, at
474–75.
424. See Dempsey, supra note 16, at 253.
425. Id.
426. See Amy J. Cohen, Moral Restorative Justice: A Political Genealogy of Activism and
Neoliberalism in the United States, 104 MINN. L. REV. 889, 892 (2019).
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integrated into the criminal legal system as alternatives to incarceration.427 These programs, however, have largely not been implemented in the area of sexual assault as they require the mutual
consent of adult defendants and victims. 428 Further elaborating on
applying these programs to address sexual assault exceeds the
scope of this Article, but suffice it to say that some sexual assault
cases might be suited for such alternatives in lieu of punitive
measures.
CONCLUSION
In “I May Destroy You,” a British television HBO series, writer
and director Michaela Coel offers a nuanced account of a sexual
assault victim’s grappling with the aftermath of the crime. 429 The
series’ narrative centers on the lingering repercussions of sexual
victimization, beginning with the assault itself and culminating in
the subsequent healing process. Subtly portraying the fifty shades
of emotional trauma following the sexual assault, the series delves
not only into questions of consent to sex but also the intersection
of race, gender, sexuality, and class.
Inspired by her own experience as a sexual assault survivor, as
well as the daughter of Ghanaian immigrants, Coel stars as Arabella, a Black, young writer living in London, who becomes heavily
intoxicated and blacks out after someone slipped a rape facilitating
drug into her drink, while out for a night at the bar with her
friends. Bruised and disoriented, Arabella has flashbacks of a man
thrusting against her in a bathroom stall, and quickly realizes that
she had fallen prey to a drug facilitated sexual assault. After piecing together from the fragmented images what had happened to
her, Arabella reports the crime to the police, and investigation ensues. Later, however, police investigators inform Arabella that in
the absence of forensic evidence, and any other leads to an identifiable suspect, the file is closed.

427. See Erik Luna, Punishment Theory, Holism, and the Procedural Conception of Restorative Justice, 2003 UTAH L. REV. 205, 223, 228–29 (2003).
428. See Margo Kaplan, Restorative Justice and Campus Sexual Misconduct, 89 TEMP.
L. REV. 701, 716 (2017).
429. See Salamishah Tillet, I May Destroy You Imagines a Path Back from Sexual Assault, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 25. 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/08/25/arts/television/imay-destroy-you-sexual-assault.html [https://perma.cc/V3BM-9UHS]; see also Carina
Chocano, ‘I May Destroy You’ Is Perfect TV for an Anxious World, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (July 29,
2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/29/magazine/i-may-destroy-you-hbo-michaela-coe
l.html [https://perma.cc/W33B-YZL5].
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Now, consider what would have happened had the crime been
committed in an American jurisdiction. Even assuming that a suspect had been identified, it is likely that prosecutors would have
chosen not to try this case in court. Arabella’s behavior preceding
the assault did not fit the traditional script of “blameless” sexual
assault victim and the societal expectations surrounding it. The
series unabashedly portrays Arabella as what many would characterize as an “imperfect victim,” who frequently voluntarily consumes alcohol and recreational drugs. Yet, on the night of the
crime, she was involuntarily drugged, which deprived her of any
agency and control over her body. Had prosecutors contemplated
whether to bring sexual assault charges based on predicting
whether a hypothetical jury would convict, it is likely that they
would have concluded that the evidence was insufficient to take
the case to trial. Such refusal to prosecute the case, however, would
have been profoundly marred by disconcerting social misconceptions about sexual assault victims who drink excessively and sometimes choose to engage in occasional sex.
Coel’s experience, as she relays in the series, is hardly unique to
her. Instead, it epitomizes what many sexual assault victims encounter namely, the legal system’s failure to prosecute their rapists. Despite continuous efforts by rape law reformers, sexual assaults largely remain underprosecuted. The problem is especially
disconcerting when victims are perceived by prosecutors as “problematic,” often due to excessive voluntary consumption of drugs
and alcohol.
Moreover, considering the underprosecution of sexual assault
through an intersectionality lens exemplifies how the problem is
further exacerbated when victims are Black, Indigenous, and People of Color, immigrants, members of the LGBTQ community, or
sex workers. Prosecutors’ discretionary decisions in refusing to
bring sexual assault charges not only shape societal norms about
permissible and impermissible sexual conduct, but also reinforces
and perpetuates prejudices and biases against sexual assault victims.
The EPM that I develop in this Article offers a civil rights underpinning for theorizing the prosecutor’s role, which is specifically
tailored to address the problem of underprosecution of sexual assault. It advances social justice goals by rectifying harms that the
law historically failed to address, mostly involving marginalized
victims who have traditionally been underprotected by the criminal legal system, including people of color. An equitable criminal
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legal system must be attentive to the close interrelationship between defendants’ and victims’ interests. It ought to take into account both defendants’ due process rights and victims’ interests in
holding wrongdoers accountable, being equally protected by the
law, and having their long-silenced voices amplified.
Yet, this Article simultaneously emphasizes the necessity of disentangling charging decisions from sentencing questions. Developing a comprehensive theory of criminalization that is not tethered
to punitive sanctions exceeds the scope of this Article. Here, I
sketch in broad strokes some preliminary thoughts on the need to
envision how the goals of criminalization might be accomplished
without supporting carceral measures, leaving for future work the
task of further theorizing alternative frameworks. Criminal enforcement of sexual assault crimes, however, will remain a necessary tool for addressing the harms of sexual victimization and for
expressing strong societal condemnation of gender-based violence
as wrongful and blameworthy behavior.

